Adam Santucci

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Have you ever felt that reading the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board is a lot like watching a tennis match?  The decisions on key workplace issues go back and forth, back and forth, and you are just stuck watching.  The good news, at least, is that lately, employers have been holding serve.  Recently, the National Labor Relations Board served up another decision that provides some clarity and helpful guidance for employers.

In Alstate Maintenance LLC, the Board clarified the definition of “concerted” under the National Labor Relations Act, and reiterated that individual employee complaints or gripes are not “concerted” activity under the Act.  Before we look at Alstate, let’s take a step back and examine what Section 7 of the Act protects.

Section 7 may be the Act’s most important provision, and it is certainly the area that gets the most attention and litigation.  Section 7 provides employees with the right “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” In order to be protected, employee activity must be “concerted” and engaged in for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”  These terms have been examined extensively by the Board and the courts.

The definition of “concerted” for example, has been argued about countless times.  For nearly three decades, the Board used a consistent standard to review whether an employee’s activities were “concerted.”   The standard is known as the Myers Industries test, and it is named after a series of cases that date back to the 1980s.  Essentially, under Myers Industries, concerted activity is defined as (1) group action or action on behalf of other employees; (2) activity seeking to initiate or prepare for group activity; or (3) bringing a group complaint to the attention of management.  Individual gripes or complaints were not protected.

The Board modified the last part of this test in 2011 when it issued its decision in WorldMark by Wyndham, which held that lodging a complaint in a group setting and using the term “we” qualified as concerted activity.  This decision essentially held that an individual complaint in a group setting qualified as “concerted” activity.

Alstate reversed WorldMark by Wyndham and reinstated the Myers Industries test set forth above.  In Alstate, the Board said that a complaint in a group setting, alone, is not enough to satisfy that test.  The Board clarified that for an employee’s statement to qualify as a group complaint, the statement must be a complaint regarding a workplace issue and the circumstances must make it clear that the employee was seeking to initiate or induce group action. In other words, an individual gripe does not qualify as concerted activity, even if it takes place in front of other employees.

We are hopeful that the Board will continue to issue employer-friendly decisions and guidance, and we will be sure to continue to provide you with updates on these decisions and other key developments.  Please subscribe to our blog by entering your email address on the right side of your screen to receive a notification when we post new information to our blog.

As stewards of taxpayer dollars, there are many details that public sector employers must consider when negotiating collective bargaining agreements with their unionized employees.  What are the phases of the collective bargaining process?  Should outside counsel be engaged for some or all of these phases?  How many bargaining sessions will be conducted?  What happens after a tentative agreement has been reached between the employer and the union?

The video below addresses these questions, and more.  Public sector employers with questions about the collective bargaining agreement should reach out to any member of McNees’ Public Sector or Labor & Employment Groups.

 

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the appeals court that has jurisdiction over federal cases in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and the U. S. Virgin Islands, recently held that a public employer violates the First Amendment of the United State Constitution when it retaliates against an employee based on the employee’s union membership.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court distinguished between First Amendment “free speech” claims and First Amendment “association” claims.

Palardy v. Township of Millburn involved a claim by a former police officer, who alleged that the Township refused to promote him to Chief, because of his affiliation with the police officers’ union.  In support of his claim, the former officer presented testimony that the Township’s business administrator made a number of derogatory comments about his role as a union leader.  Interestingly, the former police officer retired before the Chief position actually became vacant, because he believed that he would not be selected for the position.

The Township defended the claim and argued that union affiliation is not a matter of public concern, and therefore not protected by the First Amendment.  The trial court agreed, holding that speech on behalf of the union and association with the union were not constitutionally protected conduct. On appeal, the Third Circuit analyzed and rejected the trial court’s opinion, which also happened to be the same opinion reached by the majority of other circuit courts throughout the United States.

Instead, the Third Circuit adopted the minority view, and concluded that union affiliation is protected by the First Amendment freedom of association clause.  The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit, which had previously held that the union activity of public employees is always a matter of public concern, and therefore, no additional proof is necessary to establish that the union affiliation is protected.

Accordingly, when an association claim arises from a public employee’s union affiliation, the employee or former employee need not establish that his association was a matter of public concern or that an specific free speech issues are implicated.

Keep in mind that First Amendment claims still require that the plaintiff establish three things: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the defendant engaged in retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) a casual link between the protected conduct and the retaliatory action.  In Palardy, the court only considered the first question, finding conclusively that union-affiliation is constitutionally protected conduct.  The court remanded the case for consideration of the additional two elements.

While we certainly believe that this decision will result in an increase in First Amendment “association” claims (anyone who is a member of a union can now establish the first element), whether any particular plaintiff will be successful will depend on whether he or she can establish the other necessary elements of the claim, and that will still depend on the specific facts of each case.

This morning the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Janus v. AFCSME , holding that requiring public sector employees to pay fair share fees to unions violates the First Amendment. As we discussed in our prior posts , a fair share fee (sometimes called an agency fee) is a fee that non-union members must pay to the union to cover the expenses incurred by the union while representing bargaining unit employees.

Until this morning, fair share fees were legal under most state laws, and required by many collective bargaining agreements. This was true despite the fact that the employees paying the fees had intentionally opted not to join the union, because the union still had a legal obligation to represent all employees within the bargaining unit, regardless of whether the employee is a member of the union. These laws became common after the Supreme Court issued its 1977 opinion Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., which held that fair share fees were constitutional and maintained labor peace by preventing “free riders.”

In recent years, there have been increasing challenges to the constitutionality of fair share fees and the validity of Abood. Back in 2014, we discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. Quinn. The Court in Harris began to question the validity of Abood and its supporting rationale. As we noted, the Court came close to overruling Abood but ultimately decided Harris on its specific facts. It held that collection of the fair share fees in the specific context (personal assistants in Illinois) violated the First Amendment. In 2016, another challenge made it to the Court, but we got a 4-4 split decision, due to Justice Scalia’s passing shortly after oral argument

Now, with Justice Gorsuch on the bench, as was foreshadowed in Harris, the Court ruled that fair share fees violate public sector employees’ right to free speech. As a basic premise, the Court recognized that the right to free speech includes the right to refrain from speaking at all. Thus, “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates the cardinal constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned.” Accordingly, forcing employees to pay fair share fees (i.e., compelling employees to speak in support of the union when they may otherwise remain silent) violates the First Amendment. Finally, the Court overruled Abood, dissecting and dismantling its labor peace and free rider justifications.

The end result of the Court’s holding is clear: “States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. . . . Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a non-member’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.”

The Court recognized that the loss of these fair share payments would cause unions to “experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term,” but it did not think that such a challenge justified continued constitutional violations. Rather, it pointed out that such a disadvantage must be weighed against the considerable windfall that unions received in fair share fees for the 41 years after Abood.

Surely, there will be many questions that follow and we will be here to help our public sector clients navigate this new territory.

The Supreme Court of the United States held today that arbitration agreements, which waive the right to proceed as part of a class or collective action, are enforceable in the employment context. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court held that employment agreements that call for individualized arbitration proceedings to resolve workplace disputes between employers and employees are lawful. Interestingly, the Court’s 5-4 decision was authored by the newest Justice, Justice Gorsuch.

In a series of cases, employees and former employees had asserted that agreements requiring individual arbitration violate the National Labor Relations Act, because the NLRA protects employee rights to proceed in class or collective actions. Although it had previously taken a different position, in 2012, the National Labor Relations Board agreed that arbitration agreements, which waive the right to proceed in class or collective actions, violate the NLRA. The Board’s controversial position was set forth in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil USA.

Employers countered that the Federal Arbitration Act expresses a strong preference for arbitration and makes clear that arbitration agreements are presumptively valid. The FAA requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements, including procedural terms related to the arbitration process itself. The FAA does provide that arbitration agreements will not be enforced if there is a legal basis to set aside the agreement, such as fraud or duress in the making of the contract. However, in this case, the only argument presented was that the individual arbitration agreements violate the NLRA.

The Supreme Court rejected that contention. Ultimately, a slim majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the employers and held that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements, including agreements that call for individual proceedings, because such agreements do not violate NLRA. The Court noted that in order for a law such as the NLRA to trump the FAA, there must be a clear statement of intention in the law. The Court found no such clear intention in the NLRA.

The Supreme Court’s decision is the law of the land, and that means that arbitration agreements in the employment context that require individualized claims are lawful. Employers looking to update their employment agreements in light of this decision can reach out to any member of the McNees Labor and Employment Group. In addition, if you are thinking about implementing arbitration requirements for the first time, we can help.

It appears that a number of labor unions are planning for the potential negative impact of a big decision regarding fair share fees.  We have heard from several public sector clients who have been contacted directly, or who have had employees contacted, by labor unions about the potential impact of Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, which is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court.  The case, which could ultimately declare fair share fees unlawful, is expected to be released before the end of June of 2018.

Based on what we have read from these unions, they seem to believe that there is a good chance that the Supreme Court will declare fair share fees unconstitutional.

As a reminder, fair share fees are fees that are required to be paid by bargaining unit employees who elect not to be full-fledged union members.  By operation of state law, employees who are in the bargaining unit but who elect not to be union members are forced to pay “fair share” fees in many states, including Pennsylvania.  These fees are often a large percentage of the actual cost of union membership.

Public sector employees have raised multiple challenges to the constitutionality of fair share fees.  Specifically, a number of public sector employees have alleged that such fees violate employee First Amendment Rights.  We wrote about one such challenge here.  That decision, Harris v. Quinn, was highly critical of fair share fees, and the underlying justification for requiring fair share fees.  Harris closely examined the precedent that initially determined that such fees were lawful, which concluded the goals of limiting or eliminating “free riding” and the promotion of labor peace overrode any impact on employee First Amendment rights.

While it was highly critical of these stated goals, the Harris Court came just short of declaring all fair share fees unconstitutional.  A subsequent challenge to fair share fees that also reached the Supreme Court case also fell short of declaring the fees unlawful.

Enter Janus.  Janus is a public employee and member of a bargaining unit, but not a member of the union.  He has been forced to pay fair share fees for some time. Janus has argued that the union engages in certain activities that he does not support, and that the union uses his fair share fees to engage in such conduct.  Essentially, he does not support any of the union’s activities, and he believes it is unfair that he is forced to pay them to engage in such activities.  Janus wants to be able to opt out of paying any fees to the union.  Janus argues that forced fair share payments to a union he does not support is “compelled speech” in violation of his First Amendment rights.

Janus is currently pending before SCOTUS, and many believe that the Court finally has the votes to declare fair share fees unconstitutional.  Based on what we have seen, it appears that at least some labor unions agree.

Some observers believe that the elimination of fair share fees will significantly weaken the political clout of public sector labor unions.  We should soon know the fate of fair share fees generally, as the Janus decision is expected in the near future.  However, if fair share fees are declared unconstitutional, only time will tell what impact, if any, the elimination of fair share fees would have on public sector labor unions.

Stay tuned, we will keep you posted.

That sound you just heard was employers everywhere breathing a sigh of relief, and maybe even high-fiving.  That’s because the newly constituted National Labor Relations Board fired off several pro-employer decisions in the last week. The decisions were released in rapid succession in the days prior the expiration of the term of Board Chairman Phil Miscimarra.

As we reported just this week, the Board decided to modify the standard by which it determines whether employer policies are unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act.  That decision will provide some very welcome relief to employers who saw the Obama-era Board find just about every employer policy unlawful.  We also reported that we anticipate that the Board’s approach to social media will similarly become more fair and predictable.

The Trump-Board also made quick work of one of the Obama-Board’s most controversial decisions, Browning-Ferris, which created a new “joint employer” test.  We reported on the new expansive joint employer test adopted by the Board in Browning-Ferris, and expressed our concern regarding increased liability for employers under the new standard.  Browning-Ferris allowed for a joint employer finding, and increased liability, based on theoretical or “reserved” power/control, even if such control was never exercised.  In Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, the Board abandoned the Browning-Ferris standard and declared that joint-employer status requires proof that the putative joint employer has actually exercised joint control over essential employment terms, rather than merely having reserved the right to exercise control.

The Board also reversed the Obama-Board’s Specialty Healthcare decision, which allowed unions to form “micro-units.”  That decision essentially required the Board to rubber stamp the union’s definition of the appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of a union election and bargaining.  This approach exposed employers to an increased risk of organizing campaigns, and the possibility of having to negotiate with several different unions.  On December 15, 2017, in PCC Structurals, Inc., the Board abandoned the Specialty Healthcare standard and returned to its prior framework for determining the scope of a bargaining unit.

Also on December 15, 2017, the Board reversed another Obama-era decision, E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Louisville Works, which had overturned 50 years of precedent.  In DuPont, the Obama-Board dramatically expanded the definition of “change” for purposes of determining whether an employer made an unlawful unilateral change to the terms and conditions of employment.  Under DuPont, an employer was found to have engaged in an unfair labor practice charge for simply continuing to do what it had done many times previously—for years or even decades. Last week, in Raytheon Network Centric Systems, the Trump-Board reversed DuPont, and announced the return to the prior standard for determining whether an employer is authorized to make changes to the terms and conditions of employment after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.

These decisions are certainly indicative of a return to a more employer-friendly Board.  These decisions reversed some of the more controversial, and problematic, decisions of the Obama-Board.  We are certainly hopeful these are a sign of things to come from the Board.  However, with the expiration of the term of Chairman Miscimarra, we may need to wait some time before we receive another batch of pro-employer decisions.

This post was contributed by Logan Hetherington, a McNees Summer Associate. Mr. Hetherington is a rising third year law student at Penn State Dickinson Law School and is expected to earn his J.D. in May of 2018.

Well, if you are an organization that has employees, you do! Although they may be a bit unappealing and often overlooked, worksite notices are required under both federal and state law. In fact, many municipalities and cities also have ordinances that require certain notices to be posted at the workplace. Willful failure to meet posting requirements may lead to citations and other penalties.

The postings are not only important because the government says so, they also serve an integral role in educating employees. Many of the required notices inform employees of their rights, and duties, under particular statutes. This can aid employers in several ways. For example, if employers have up-to-date notices posted where employees can frequently see them, the employers shield themselves from future issues when dealing with employee grievances because the employee cannot claim ignorance. Moreover, management will be more aware of potential illegal conduct which could put the employer in the hot seat and (hopefully) make better decisions with respect to employee relations.

The majority of required worksite notices can be acquired from the United States Department of Labor or state departments of labor. The notices and posters may be obtained free of charge from these agencies, or, employers can purchase them from private retailers. However, employers should be aware that many of these postings have specific requirements. The posters and notices must be placed where employees can openly see them and many must be posted in Spanish or other language versions if employees don’t speak English. Additionally, not all employers have to post the same notices. Government contractors, for instance, are obligated to post specific notices regarding prevailing wages and other employee rights. Likewise, smaller employers may not be subject to some posting requirements.

Even though most worksite postings are easily accessible, many employers may be surprised to learn that their posters and notices are actually out-of-date. The content of the notices change as the law does. Consequently, governments routinely revise their posters and notices but typically don’t inform employers of these revisions. Employers should routinely check their postings and update them as necessary. Our Labor and Employment Group maintains a list of required federal and Pennsylvania worksite notices. We also aid employers in navigating the complex overlap between federal, state, and local posting requirements and can help employers ensure that they are in compliance with postings and the statutes which trigger them.

In a closely watched case for employers, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and the U.S. Virgin Islands, recently held that retiree healthcare benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) may be subject to modification following the expiration of the CBA.

Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc. was a class action suit brought on behalf of a group of retirees, who were all former bargaining unit members.  Generally, the retirees alleged that they were entitled to healthcare benefits “for life” pursuant to the terms of the CBAs in place at the time of retirement.  When the employer placed a cap of $50,000 on the amount of benefits to be paid to the retirees, they brought suit.  The retirees argued that their entitlement to healthcare benefits had vested, and that the employer’s decision to cap their benefits was a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act and/or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected these arguments.  The court held that the employer was not required to provide retirees healthcare benefits for life, and instead was only required to provide those benefits for the duration of the relevant CBA.  Essentially the court held that when the CBA expired, so did the employer’s obligation to continue to provide retiree healthcare benefits.  In reaching its decision, the court applied ordinary principles of contract interpretation, and noted that those principles provide that all contractual obligations cease upon the expiration of the CBA.

The court’s holding does leave open the possibility that other retirees could establish a vested entitlement to lifetime retiree healthcare benefits if the CBA language supported such a right.

As noted, this is an important decision for employers.  Many employers face significant legacy costs related to retiree healthcare, pension benefits and other post-employment benefits.  In light of Grove, many employers may begin to evaluate their post-employment benefit obligations.  However, these employers must carefully evaluate any such contractual obligations, because as Grove makes clear, whether retiree healthcare benefits are vested for life will be determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the specific CBA language.

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Back in 2015, Pittsburgh enacted a paid sick leave ordinance, following a trend among cities throughout the country. Pittsburgh’s paid sick leave ordinance required employers with fifteen employees or more to provide up to forty hours of paid sick leave per calendar year. Employers with less than fifteen employees were not spared. The ordinance required that those employers provide up to twenty-four hours per calendar year. The impact: 50,000 workers would receive paid sick leave.

But, what authority did Pittsburgh have to impose such a requirement?

The Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association, among others, challenged whether Pittsburgh actually had authority to enact the ordinance. Initially, the trial court found that the Steel City had no such authority. Pittsburgh appealed, arguing that because it had adopted a Home Rule Charter, it had authority to exercise broad powers and authority.

A few weeks ago, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued its opinion, agreeing with the trial court that Pittsburgh indeed lacked the necessary authority. The court found that the Home Rule Charter Law has an exception with respect to the regulation of businesses. The exception specifically provides that “a municipality which adopts a home rule charter shall not determine duties, responsibilities or requirements placed upon businesses, occupations and employers . . . except as expressly provided by [separate] statutes . . . .” Although Pittsburgh attempted to point to various statutes which it felt provided it with the needed authority, the court was not convinced. Struck down by the court, it was – and remains – the worst of times for Pittsburgh’s paid sick leave ordinance.

But, what about Philadelphia? It is a home rule charter municipality. It has a paid sick leave ordinance. Does the Commonwealth Court’s opinion effectively render its ordinance invalid, too? Nope. Philadelphia’s authority is derived from a different law, which applies only to cities of the first class (oh, and Philly is the only First Class City in Pennsylvania under the law). It includes no such limitation on the regulation of businesses. Yet, while Philadelphia’s statute may be unaffected by the court’s opinion, it may not be best of times for Philadelphia’s ordinance either. The Pennsylvania State Legislature is making efforts to affect Philadelphia and all municipalities. Senator John Eichelberger’s Senate Bill 128 would ban municipalities from passing sick leave and other leave requirements that are stronger than those required by federal and state governments. The bill was voted out of committee and is set for consideration by the Senate.

So, for our blog subscribers with businesses only in the city limits of Pittsburgh, there is no requirement that you establish a paid sick leave program for your employees. However, Philadelphia’s paid sick leave ordinance remains alive and well, and you must abide by its requirements. While some do not expect the General Assembly to move this bill through both chambers before the end of the current session, we will track the bill’s progress and update this blog should it be considered and voted on by the Senate. So, stay tuned for future posts on legislation effecting Philadelphia’s and all municipalities’ authority to impose paid sick leave requirements.