Yesterday, we reported on a Commonwealth Court decision that basically concluded that an arbitrator’s award ordering the reinstatement of a discharged employee who is incapable of performing his job violates the “essence test.” We also noted that a subsequent decision of the court seems to be a bit in conflict with that holding. Let’s take a closer look at that decision.

The Commonwealth Court addressed (what appeared to be) a similar question in the context of a state trooper. The Trooper, a male, had a romantic relationship with a female, which ultimately failed. Thereafter, the female Trooper filed complaints that alleged the male Trooper was harassing her. The Pennsylvania State Police conducted an investigation and found the complaints unsubstantiated. Alleging the same behavior, the female Trooper filed for a Protection of Abuse order (PFA). A judge ultimately issued the PFA, which had a condition that the male Trooper could not carry a firearm. Because he could not carry a firearm, the male Trooper was placed on restrictive duty pending an additional internal investigation. Upon confirming that the PFA included a condition that barred him from carrying a firearm, the State Police terminated the male Trooper.

The Trooper filed a grievance and ultimately submitted the issue to arbitration. The arbitrator ordered that the Trooper be reinstated. The State Police appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Same result as the correctional officer, right? He cannot perform the essential duties of his position, so requiring his employment infringes managerial rights? Nope.

There are two key differences. First, unlike the correctional officer, whose collective bargaining rights are set out in the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), the state trooper’s collective bargaining rights are established under Act 111. In reviewing arbitration awards under PERA the court uses the highly deferential essence test. However, in reviewing arbitration awards under Act 111, the court uses an even more deferential and narrow test. It is indeed narrow, justifying a vacation of an arbitrator’s award only if there is a lack of jurisdiction, irregularity of proceedings, excess in the exercise of powers, or deprivation of constitutional rights. The State Police argued that the Trooper’s reinstatement was in excess of the arbitrator’s powers. The court disagreed, finding that there is only an excess use of powers if the award requires an illegal act or performance of an act which cannot be done voluntarily. No such excess was present here.

The second difference is more fundamental: unlike the correctional officer, the State Police’s justification for the Trooper’s termination was not his inability to perform the essential functions of a police officer (carry a firearm), but it was the harassing conduct underlying the issuance of the PFA. According to the State Police, the underlying conduct violated department regulations for “unbecoming conduct” and “conformance of laws.” However, those regulations required physical abuse, commission of a felony or misdemeanor, or use of a firearm. None of the harassing conduct underlying the PFA involved any of this type of conduct. Thus, the court found the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in concluding that there was not just cause for the Trooper’s termination.

So, for our public employer subscribers, these cases serve as a reminder that arbitrator decisions are subject to great deference on appeal, making success during arbitration of critical importance. But more importantly, it makes clear that if you are planning on terminating an employee who has established that he or she is unable to perform the essential duties of his or her position, that must be the documented basis (or at least part) for the termination.

In November 2017, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion concerning an arbitrator’s reinstatement of a state correctional officer (“CO”). The CO was responsible for monitoring inmates who worked on the prison’s loading dock. As far back as 2015, the CO’s supervisors noticed unauthorized food items in the dock area. Despite instruction to remove all unauthorized food from the dock, the CO continued to allow inmates to remove food from deliveries, and he personally took food for himself. Finding that he violated several orders, the CO was temporarily removed from his position and later reinstated. Shortly after his reinstatement, a routine search of the dock again found contraband food. This time he was discharged.

The CO filed a grievance and later submitted the issue to arbitration, claiming that the Department of Corrections violated the collective bargaining agreement by discharging him without just cause. The arbitrator agreed and reinstated the CO with a 30-day suspension. The arbitrator found that the CO was not irredeemable, just that “he should not be in a position which requires his supervision of inmates.” The arbitrator noted that the CO must have agreed with his inability to supervise inmates because he applied for, and was granted, a transfer to a guard tower position prior to his termination. Thus, the arbitrator found there was just cause to discipline the CO, but termination was not warranted.

The Department appealed the arbitrator’s award to the Commonwealth Court. The Court reviewed the award using the well-established “essence test,” which is a highly deferential standard. The essence test requires the court to affirm an arbitrator’s award so long as it can be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement. The Department argued that the award was not rationally derived from the CBA. It asserted that the award required it to employ a CO who could not perform the functions of the job, i.e. the care, custody and control of inmates. The Commonwealth Court agreed.

The court held that since the arbitrator found that the CO should not be in a position which requires supervision of inmates, the CO could not perform the statutorily-defined duties of a correctional officer. Thus, reinstatement would force the Department to employ an officer with limitations on his ability to interact with inmates. The court found this was in direct contradiction to the managerial rights enumerated in the CBA, which provided the Department had authority to direct its workforce to satisfy its operational needs. Accordingly, the court found arbitrator’s award was not rationally derived from the CBA.

For many public employers in Pennsylvania, the court’s decision is a welcomed limitation on the seemingly limitless power of arbitrators. It just makes sense that an arbitrator should not be permitted to reinstate an employee who the arbitrator himself has determined is incapable of performing his job.

However, a subsequent decision of the Commonwealth Court, analyzing a similar issue, has left some public employers scratching their heads. We will cover the subsequent decision in a post tomorrow.

That sound you just heard was employers everywhere breathing a sigh of relief, and maybe even high-fiving.  That’s because the newly constituted National Labor Relations Board fired off several pro-employer decisions in the last week. The decisions were released in rapid succession in the days prior the expiration of the term of Board Chairman Phil Miscimarra.

As we reported just this week, the Board decided to modify the standard by which it determines whether employer policies are unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act.  That decision will provide some very welcome relief to employers who saw the Obama-era Board find just about every employer policy unlawful.  We also reported that we anticipate that the Board’s approach to social media will similarly become more fair and predictable.

The Trump-Board also made quick work of one of the Obama-Board’s most controversial decisions, Browning-Ferris, which created a new “joint employer” test.  We reported on the new expansive joint employer test adopted by the Board in Browning-Ferris, and expressed our concern regarding increased liability for employers under the new standard.  Browning-Ferris allowed for a joint employer finding, and increased liability, based on theoretical or “reserved” power/control, even if such control was never exercised.  In Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, the Board abandoned the Browning-Ferris standard and declared that joint-employer status requires proof that the putative joint employer has actually exercised joint control over essential employment terms, rather than merely having reserved the right to exercise control.

The Board also reversed the Obama-Board’s Specialty Healthcare decision, which allowed unions to form “micro-units.”  That decision essentially required the Board to rubber stamp the union’s definition of the appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of a union election and bargaining.  This approach exposed employers to an increased risk of organizing campaigns, and the possibility of having to negotiate with several different unions.  On December 15, 2017, in PCC Structurals, Inc., the Board abandoned the Specialty Healthcare standard and returned to its prior framework for determining the scope of a bargaining unit.

Also on December 15, 2017, the Board reversed another Obama-era decision, E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Louisville Works, which had overturned 50 years of precedent.  In DuPont, the Obama-Board dramatically expanded the definition of “change” for purposes of determining whether an employer made an unlawful unilateral change to the terms and conditions of employment.  Under DuPont, an employer was found to have engaged in an unfair labor practice charge for simply continuing to do what it had done many times previously—for years or even decades. Last week, in Raytheon Network Centric Systems, the Trump-Board reversed DuPont, and announced the return to the prior standard for determining whether an employer is authorized to make changes to the terms and conditions of employment after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.

These decisions are certainly indicative of a return to a more employer-friendly Board.  These decisions reversed some of the more controversial, and problematic, decisions of the Obama-Board.  We are certainly hopeful these are a sign of things to come from the Board.  However, with the expiration of the term of Chairman Miscimarra, we may need to wait some time before we receive another batch of pro-employer decisions.

In September, President Trump nominated management-side labor and employment lawyer Peter Robb to replace Richard Griffin, whose term expired on November 4, 2017, as general counsel to the National Labor Relations Board.  Yesterday, the United States Senate confirmed Robb’s appointment to the position.

As general counsel, Robb will play an important role at the NLRB.  He is now responsible for overseeing the Board’s regional offices and legal staff nationwide.  He also has broad discretion to investigate and prosecute unfair labor practice cases that are filed with the Board.

Robb’s confirmation solidifies Republican control of the Board, which already consisted of three Republican and two Democrat Members.  With Robb’s confirmation complete, many expect the Board to reverse significant pro-labor decisions rendered during the Obama-era.  It should be noted, however, that Republican Board Member and Acting Chairman Philip Miscimarra’s term ends on December 16, 2017, leaving another vacancy for President Trump to fill.

As always, we will keep an eye on developments at the National Labor Relations Board, reporting significant decisions and events here on our blog.

In a closely watched case for employers, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and the U.S. Virgin Islands, recently held that retiree healthcare benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) may be subject to modification following the expiration of the CBA.

Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc. was a class action suit brought on behalf of a group of retirees, who were all former bargaining unit members.  Generally, the retirees alleged that they were entitled to healthcare benefits “for life” pursuant to the terms of the CBAs in place at the time of retirement.  When the employer placed a cap of $50,000 on the amount of benefits to be paid to the retirees, they brought suit.  The retirees argued that their entitlement to healthcare benefits had vested, and that the employer’s decision to cap their benefits was a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act and/or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected these arguments.  The court held that the employer was not required to provide retirees healthcare benefits for life, and instead was only required to provide those benefits for the duration of the relevant CBA.  Essentially the court held that when the CBA expired, so did the employer’s obligation to continue to provide retiree healthcare benefits.  In reaching its decision, the court applied ordinary principles of contract interpretation, and noted that those principles provide that all contractual obligations cease upon the expiration of the CBA.

The court’s holding does leave open the possibility that other retirees could establish a vested entitlement to lifetime retiree healthcare benefits if the CBA language supported such a right.

As noted, this is an important decision for employers.  Many employers face significant legacy costs related to retiree healthcare, pension benefits and other post-employment benefits.  In light of Grove, many employers may begin to evaluate their post-employment benefit obligations.  However, these employers must carefully evaluate any such contractual obligations, because as Grove makes clear, whether retiree healthcare benefits are vested for life will be determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the specific CBA language.

In City of Allentown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the City to implement an interest arbitration award which contained (among modifications to wages, sick leave, vacation, pension and overtime) a minimum staffing requirement of 25 firefighters per shift.

As every public sector employer and practitioner knows, a municipality has no obligation to bargain with a union representing police officers or firefighters over inherent managerial policy (overall budget, standards of service, organizational structure, selection and direction of employees).  I mean, it says so, right there in the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act!  The PLRA is forever linked to Act 111, which makes it mandatory for municipalities to bargain with police and fire unions over the terms and conditions of employment (compensation, hours, working conditions, other benefits).

Act 111 also provides the mechanism for municipalities and unions to submit their disputes to binding interest arbitration, but only those disputes which concern mandatory subjects of bargaining.  An arbitration panel that issues an award on a topic that is a managerial prerogative exceeds its powers.

But, what happens when a dispute concerns both a mandatory subject (i.e. it is rationally related to the terms and conditions of employment) and a managerial policy (i.e., budget or direction of personnel)?  Well, then the question is whether bargaining with the union over the issue would unduly infringe on the municipality’s essential managerial responsibilities.  That is the analysis that the Supreme Court applied to the minimum staffing dispute facing the City of Allentown and the International Association of Fire Fighters Local 302.

Prior case law left us with this:  the total number of firefighters that a municipality employs is a matter of managerial prerogative and a municipality need not bargain over that number.  An arbitration award that mandates a total complement number is illegal.  Prior case law also left us with this:  the number of firefighters actually assigned to a particular station or to a piece of fire equipment is a mandatory subject of bargaining, as it is rationally related to the safety of firefighters, i.e. a working condition.  So, an arbitration award that mandates the minimum crew on each rig is perfectly legal.

Confused?  Citing safety concerns and relying heavily on arbitration testimony that increased staffing leads to a safer working environment and a decrease in injuries and physical stress, the Court concluded that minimum staffing had a “direct and significant impact on firefighter health and safety” and did not unduly infringe on the City’s financial burdens.

More directly, the Court (currently comprised of 1 elected Republican, 5 elected Democrats and 1 Republican appointed by a Democrat Governor) did little more than pay lip service to how minimum staffing leads to increased overtime, or how increased overtime leads to increased pension expenses, or how increased pension expenses lead to unfunded pension liabilities, or how unfunded pension liabilities are crippling so many municipalities across the Commonwealth.

So what now? It appears that the overall complement is still a decision left for the public employer; however, once that number is set, then the parties must negotiate regarding the number of employees assigned to each shift.  Certainly, this leaves many questions unanswered.  And certainly, the impact on municipal budgets, already strained and struggling, will be significant.

In 2010, two employees filed a claim against their former employer, Robert Half International, Inc., alleging that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). In addition to individual claims, the plaintiffs brought a collective action on behalf of all other similarly situated employees. The plaintiffs, however, had signed employment agreements containing arbitration clauses, which generally required that any dispute arising out of their employment be submitted to arbitration. It was silent as to class-wide claims.

The employer filed a motion to compel the employees to resolve their claims through arbitration on an individualized basis. The court ordered the employees to submit their claims to arbitration but left for the arbitrator to decide whether the claims could proceed on a class basis. The arbitrator subsequently ruled that class arbitration was permitted under the agreements. The employer appealed and argued that the question of whether the employees could submit claims to arbitration on a class-wide basis is one to be decided by the courts, not an arbitrator.

The First Shoe

The Third Circuit agreed. The court first explained that it is generally the province of the courts to resolve “questions of arbitrability.” That is, courts have narrow authority to decide whether or not an arbitration clause applies to particular claims and/or particular parties. On the other hand, arbitrators decide all issues they have been authorized by the parties to resolve. This includes procedural questions, and in traditional litigation, questions of class are procedural in nature. So, in this case, the court was presented with the following question: when an arbitration clause is silent as to arbitration on a class basis, is the permissibility of class arbitration a “question of arbitrability” to be decided by the court, or is it a procedural question to be decided by an arbitrator?

In a precedential opinion issued in 2014, the Third Circuit held that it was a question of arbitrability reserved for the court, because it was an issue of whether the clause applies to particular claims and/or parties. With this ruling, the Third Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the employment agreements authorized class arbitration. On remand, finding no explicit language in the arbitration clauses, and finding no other evidence to the contrary, the district court found that class arbitration was not permitted under the agreement. The employees appealed.

The Other Shoe (sort of)

In a non-binding decision issued at the end of January, the Third Circuit agreed that class arbitration was not permitted. First, the court recognized that “a party may only be compelled to submit to class arbitration if there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, Inc., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). To determine whether the parties agreed to class arbitration in this case, the court first looked for explicit language of authorization, noting that under Third Circuit precedent, “silence regarding class arbitrability generally indicates a prohibition.” Quillion v. Tenet HealthSystems Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012). It found no explicit language. Despite this finding and its precedent concerning the silence of class arbitration, the court did not stop there. It went on to look for implicit authorization elsewhere in the employment agreement. It again found nothing and affirmed that the agreement did not authorize class-wide arbitration.

While this ruling resolves this case and gives guidance moving forward, it does not definitively answer whether the absence of explicit language precludes class arbitration. To the contrary, the court’s analysis suggests that class arbitration could be inferred from other language in the employment agreement. So, going forward, to avoid a court making such an inference – one contrary to your true intent – inclusion of explicit language prohibiting class arbitration remains the best policy. However, you must be aware that the National Labor Relations Board takes the position that explicit prohibitions of class arbitration violate the National Labor Relations Act. Three courts of appeals, among other courts, have disagreed and overturned the Board’s position. Stay tuned, as the Supreme Court of the United States is set to resolve this question later this year.

On November 3, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC, finding that the Trump International Hotel, Las Vegas unlawfully refused to bargain with UNITE HERE International Union after the union won a representation election among the Hotel’s housekeeping, food and beverage and guest service employees.

….In other news, just five days later, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States with the pledges to Make America Great Again, to cultivate more good paying jobs for Americans and to undo much of the agenda of the Obama administration.

Over the past several Presidential transitions, the Human Resources community has become accustomed to the swinging pendulum in the areas of labor and employment law.  We know change is coming.  We’re just not always sure what exactly it will involve.   Everyone remembers the threat of unions being certified on the basis of a card check, right?  That didn’t happen in 2009, but of course quickie elections did.  So making specific predictions on Inauguration Day can be dangerous.   But as the new Administration now has officially taken over, we have to at least try.

Here’s an easy one:  President Trump is unlikely to be appointing what we would call traditional candidates to run the departments and agencies that regulate the American workplace.    While he has nominated some people who have significant governmental service on their resumes, the current list includes a fair share of people with no such experience – – CEOs, philanthropists, investment bankers, a neurosurgeon, even the co-founder of World Wrestling Entertainment.   These appointments do not signal “business as usual” for the federal government, nor did the President who, in his inaugural address, pledged to transfer power from Washington back to the American people.

At first blush, this would portend wholesale rollback of workplace regulations.  Indeed, President Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Labor, fast-food executive Andrew Puzder, has been a critic of substantially increasing the minimum wage and a vocal opponent of the Obama administration’s efforts to make more workers eligible for overtime pay.  And critics have noted similar opposition by other nominees to what has been the recent mission or focus of the agency that they may be leading (See Governor Rick Perry and Betsy DeVos).

But here’s the rub:  a substantial portion of President Trump’s electoral base of support likely will not support the pendulum swinging back in ways that make their workplaces less safe or adversely impact their earnings.  So…this will be a bit more complicated.

What can we say now in January 2017 with confidence?

  • We’re not going to get back all of that time we spent learning the ever changing minutiae of the Affordable Care Act.  But we can certainly anticipate that there will be new regulation impacting employer provided health insurance.
  • We will see change in leadership at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The current EEOC Chair’s term will end in July 2017, and the new Chair will likely fill the now vacant EEOC General Counsel position.   That new leadership is less likely to retain the current EEOC’s focus upon pay equity issues and seeking to expand gender identity and sexual orientation protections through selective litigation.   And let’s not forget the agency’s proposed regulations that would require employers to provide compensation data and hours for all employees as part of the EEO-1 reporting process.  We think that it is unlikely that these requirements will become effective in March 2018, as currently planned.
  • The NLRB will be looking at the bureaucratic version of Extreme Home Makeover.  Readers of our Annual NLRB Year in Review will recall that the Obama Board has involved itself in everything from revising the representation election timeline, to creating rights to use your email system for organizing activity to uncovering the dastardly hidden meaning of the most innocuous provisions of your employee handbook.  They expanded the concept of joint employment to the point you might have to sit at the bargaining table to discuss wages, benefits and working conditions of people who are not even your employees.  And then when they were done with that, they even tried to get involved in college football!  The party’s soon over at the Board.  President Trump will have the opportunity to fill two current Member vacancies on the Board as soon as he gets down to work.  More critically, by November he will have the opportunity to replace NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin Jr., an Obama appointee, former union lawyer and spearhead for most of the NLRB’s most aggressive initiatives.
  • OSHA recordkeeping requirements should be reduced.  We know how this has been an area of focus over the past 8 years and has caused more work for employers.  And the new silica rules and anti-retaliation rules that seek to effectively prohibit mandatory post-accident drug testing and safety incentive programs may soon be on the cutting room floor.

So, that’s enough prognostication on Day 1 of the Trump Administration.  Stay tuned!

 

Public employers in Pennsylvania beware: if you implement an attendance policy designed to get your employees to show up for work, you may commit an unfair labor practice!  If your employees are represented by a labor union, and your policy outlines disciplinary action, then you must bargain with the appropriate union before issuing discipline under the policy.  The employer in Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., learned that the hard way.

In that case, the public school district unilaterally adopted a new attendance and punctuality policy.  The new policy applied progressive discipline to employees who reached a certain number of absences due to personal illness.  The updated policy was adopted shortly after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between the district and its employees.

Upon learning of the change, the employees’ union filed an unfair labor practice charge, arguing that the district committed an unfair labor practice by adopting the policy without engaging in collective bargaining.  The union pointed to the prior collective bargaining agreement’s sick leave provisions, which provided each employee with eleven sick days per school year and was silent on discipline.  The district countered that the updated policy did not impose a new source of discipline; employees were always subject to discipline for attendance violations.  Rather, according to the employer, the new policy simply advised employees as to how attendance issues were tracked for disciplinary purposes.

The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board rejected the employer’s arguments, finding that the district committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment through adopting the new attendance policy.  The district appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which upheld the Board’s determination.  The Court provided several reasons for doing so.

First, it recognized the PLRB’s long history of treating sick leave policies as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.  Second, the Commonwealth Court held that new policy did not simply explain how the district tracked absences for disciplinary purposes; instead, it specifically imposed progressive discipline for using sick days.  An employer’s unilateral changing of terms and conditions of employment, explained the Court, is an unfair labor practice regardless of whether it happens during the term of a CBA, following the expiration of a CBA or during the course of negotiations.  Moreover, the new policy directly conflicted with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which did not provide for disciplinary action.

This case serves as an important reminder to public employers in Pennsylvania that when adopting new policies, a careful examination of the appropriate collective bargaining agreements is required.  Before implementing new rules that can result in disciplinary action, negotiation is typically required.  Adopting new disciplinary rules without engaging in collective bargaining will not withstand the scrutiny of the PLRB or Pennsylvania courts.

In a recent decision, the National Labor Relations Board confronted the issue of whether it has jurisdiction over The Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School (PVCS) – a school formed pursuant Pennsylvania’s Charter School Law. In addressing the issue, the Board was confronted with two questions: (1) whether the school was exempt from the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) as a political subdivision; and (2) if the school was not exempt, whether the Board should nevertheless exercise its statutorily-granted discretion to decline jurisdiction. It answered both questions with a resounding “no.”

Political Subdivision Exemption

Political subdivisions are excluded from the list of “employers” subject to the Act. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, an entity is a “political subdivision” if it was created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of government, or it is administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.

Applying this test, the Board held that PVCS was not created directly by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but was a created by private individuals that formed a non-profit corporation. To reach this conclusion, the Board asked whether PVCS was created by a governmental entity, legislative or judicial act, or public official. It found that the answer was no. The Board found it largely irrelevant that: (1) the school’s charter was – as it must be under the Charter School Law – issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Education; (2) PVCS received ninety-seven percent of its funding from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and (3) the Charter School Law places employees of cyber charter schools within Pennsylvania’s public employee labor relations system.

Moreover, the Board found that PVCS was not administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or the general electorate. Under this prong of the political subdivision test, the Board examined if the administrators are individuals appointed by, or subject to removal procedures applicable to, public officials. PVCS’ board of trustees were appointed and removed pursuant to the school’s bylaws. The bylaws provided that sitting board members appoint and remove other board members, and only board members appoint and remove administrators. Under the Charter School Law the board members are statutorily deemed “public officials.” The Board held that despite the Charter School Law’s designation of the board members as “public officials,” they were not public officials for purposes of the Act. It reasoned that “PVCS’ board was created and governed by its internal bylaws (the first board was selected by the private citizens . . .) and is a self-perpetuating entity.” Accordingly, the Board found that PVCS was not administered by individuals responsible to public officials or the general electorate and was not a political subdivision.

Declination of Jurisdiction

Having concluded that PVCS was not exempt as a political subdivision, the Board finally examined whether it would nevertheless exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction. PVCS argued that the Board should decline jurisdiction because cyber charter schools do not have a substantial effect on commerce and exercising jurisdiction would supplant state control. The Board found that PVCS had 3000 students, it had an operating budget in the millions of dollars each year, and it was only one of fourteen cyber charter schools in Pennsylvania. As a result, the Board determined that there was sufficient impact on commerce to justify maintaining jurisdiction. Additionally, the Board concluded that its jurisdiction would not supplant state control because charter schools are not state schools, but an alternative permitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As such, it held that PVCS should be subject to the same federal regulations as other private employers.

It is noteworthy that the Board reached the same conclusion with respect to charter schools in New York. You can find the full PVCS opinion here. You can find the New York opinion here.

Our regular blog subscribers will note that we have routinely commented on the Board’s increasing efforts to expand its jurisdiction. This is yet another instance. Why does this matter? Even though your business may not be a charter school, it is a reminder that the Board is continuing its aggressive expansion of the Act.