Discrimination & Harassment

On June 6, 2018, Governor Wolf signed Executive Order 2018-18-03, which is designed to combat the gender pay gap in Pennsylvania. The Executive Order directs all state agencies under the governor’s jurisdiction to:

  • no longer inquire about a job applicant’s current compensation or compensation history at any stage during the hiring process;
  • base salaries on job responsibilities, position pay range, and the applicant’s knowledge, skills, competencies, experience, compensation requests, or other bona fide factor other than sex, except where compensation is based on:
      • a collective bargaining agreement;
      • a seniority system;
      • a system of merit pay increases;
      • a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, sales goals, and incentives
  • clearly identify the appropriate pay range on job postings.

The Executive Order does expressly state that applicants are not prohibited from volunteering information about their current compensation level or salary history in negotiating a salary. However, no agency can request that an applicant disclose current salary or salary history information.

So why the need for the Executive Order? Some argue that by asking an applicant to reveal their current salary or salary history, employers are perpetuating pay inequality between men and women. The reasoning is that because women have been paid less than men historically, asking applicants their salary history and then basing salary determinations on prior pay information further continues the cycle of pay inequality.

While the Executive Order is only applicable to Commonwealth agencies under the Governor’s jurisdiction, it may signal a push to address the gender pay gap throughout Pennsylvania.

Please feel free to contact any member of the McNees Wallace & Nurick Labor and Employment Practice if you have any questions regarding this article.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that discrimination against transgender/LBGTQ employees is discrimination on the basis of sex that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.  Moreover, the court held that the employer could not use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as a defense to justify such discrimination.

The Plaintiff began work as a funeral director and presented as a male (birth sex).  Eventually, Plaintiff informed the funeral home that she had a gender identity disorder and would transition to female.  Plaintiff was fired when she informed the funeral home she was no longer going to present as a male and would transition and dress as a female.  The funeral home contended that continued employment would harm its business clients and violated the funeral home’s owner’s Christian beliefs.

The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit under Title VII alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.  The funeral home owner defended the termination under the RFRA.  The RFRA prohibits enforcement of a religiously neutral law that substantially burdens religious exercise, unless the law is the least restrictive way to further a compelling government interest.

The district court held that Plaintiff was discriminated against based upon sex stereotypes, but held the EEOC could not enforce a Title VII claim because it would burden the employer’s exercise of religion in violation of the RFRA.  The court granted summary judgment to the funeral home.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of LGBTQ status.  Perhaps more importantly, the court held that the funeral home was not entitled to a RFRA defense on the ground that continuing Stephens’ employment would not, as a matter of law, burden the employer’s exercise of religion and, even if it did, the EEOC had established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the EEOC’s compelling interest in combating and eradicating sex discrimination.

In the months since the Harvey Weinstein scandal, there have been countless efforts to raise awareness of workplace sexual harassment.  Actresses donned black dresses at the Golden Globe Awards earlier this month to promote #MeToo and the related Time’s Up initiative.  Last weekend, the music industry’s elite carried white roses at the Grammy Awards to show solidarity for the movement.  These efforts, however, are not limited to celebrities.  Many other initiatives have sprung up in response to workplace sexual harassment issues – including those in our federal and state legislatures.

The most notable legislative development to date was tucked into the federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which President Trump signed into law at the end of December.  The Act adds a provision to the Internal Revenue Code prohibiting tax deductions for payments or settlements “related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse”, and for attorneys’ fees related to such payments or settlements, if the payment is subject to a non-disclosure agreement.  Essentially, it is intended to discourage the use of non-disclosure provisions in settlements of sexual harassment or abuse claims by forcing employers to choose between the tax deduction and confidentiality.  It applies to amounts paid or incurred after December 22, 2017.

The good news is that the provision appears to be limited to settlements involving actual allegations of sexual harassment or abuse, rather than to every settlement involving a general release of claims.  The bad news is that the provision leaves many questions unanswered, including the key question: What constitutes a payment “related to sexual harassment or abuse”?  We anticipate that regulations implementing the Act will address this and other ambiguities in the provision.  Until then, however, employers are well-advised to consult with their financial and legal advisors regarding the applicability of this provision to their individual circumstances.

Employers also should be aware of other legislative initiatives targeting the use of non-disclosure agreements.  An increasing number of states have introduced legislation to prohibit the use of non-disclosure agreements in sexual harassment claims entirely.  In November 2017, Pennsylvania Senator Judy Schwank (D) introduced Senate Bill 999 that would ban non-disclosure provisions in any contract or settlement relating to “sexual misconduct”.  Among other things, the bill would prohibit an agreement not to disclose the name of a person suspected of sexual harassment.  It remains to be seen whether, or in what form, Senate Bill 999 may be passed into law.

In the meantime, beyond staying abreast of the latest legal developments, you might be asking yourself, What can my company do to raise awareness of – and effectively address – issues of sexual harassment (and other types of discriminatory harassment) in the workplace?  Click here to learn more about how you can educate your workforce, update and strengthen your policies and procedures, and effectively investigate reported concerns of harassment in your workplace.  We also will cover lingering questions about sexual harassment issues in the workplace and conducting workplace investigations at McNees’ 28th Annual Labor & Employment Law Seminar on May 11, 2018.  Stay tuned to our blog for details, or contact any member of McNees’ Labor & Employment practice group for more information.

Last November, we explained the decision in the case of U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Scott Medical Health Center, P.C., from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  There, the court concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation.  Our previous post on this case can be found here.

To recap, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) filed the lawsuit on behalf of a gay, male former employee of Scott Medical, alleging that his supervisor subjected him to anti-gay epithets and a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation.  The court refused to dismiss the case because, in the words of U.S. District Judge Cathy Bissoon, “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a subset of sexual stereotyping and thus covered by Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination ‘because of sex’.”

On September 25, 2017, the court entered a default judgment against Scott Medical on the issue of liability.  The court found that the company had committed an intentional violation of Title VII.  This finding was based on the fact that Scott Medical’s Chief Executive Officer was aware of the supervisor’s harassing actions and refused to take any action to stop the conduct or correct the hostile work environment.

On November 16, 2017, after a trial on issue of damages, Judge Bissoon ordered Scott Medical to pay the employee $5,500.43 in back pay and prejudgment interest.  More importantly, she also ordered Scott Medical to pay the statutory maximum amount of $50,000 as compensatory and punitive damages.  If not for the statutory cap on such damages, Judge Bissoon opined that “punitive damages in the amount of $75,000 would be warranted by the evidence” in this case.

Notably, the supporting evidence cited by the court included the fact that Scott Medical failed to train the harassing supervisor on its anti-harassment policy.  In fact, Scott Medical could not identify anyone who would have provided such training to any of its supervisors.  Similarly, the former employee testified that he never received a copy of the Company’s anti-harassment policy and was never trained about harassment in the workplace.

There are several clear takeaways from this case.  First, as we explained here, regular and effective anti-harassment training is an essential part of preventing harassment in any organization.  This case provides 55,000 reasons to ensure that such training is provided to supervisors and managers, as well as all other employees.

The second takeaway is to revisit your organization’s Equal Employment Opportunity and Anti-Harassment policies, and consider adding sexual orientation as a protected trait.  As you update your policies, keep in mind the importance of responding promptly and appropriately when complaints are raised about harassment – including harassment based on sexual orientation.  It also may be a good time to update your anti-harassment training to specifically address issues of discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation.

There also may be more to come with the Scott Medical case.  Now that a final judgment has been entered, an appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals may be forthcoming.  If the case is appealed, the Third Circuit likely will be forced to reconsider several prior decisions in which it found that sexual orientation was not protected under Title VII.  We will continue to provide updates as developments in this area occur.

LGBTQ workplace rights is perhaps the most rapidly evolving area in employment law.  On October 4, 2017, United States Attorney General Jeff Sessions formally weighed in on the topic.  He issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors declaring that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit employment discrimination based on transgender status.  According to the memo, “Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women but does not encompass discrimination based on gender identity per se, including transgender status.”

So, does the Attorney General’s memo mean that employers can freely discriminate on the basis of gender identity?  Not exactly.  A number of federal courts have held that employment bias based on an individual’s transgender status is a form of unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII (the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all issued such rulings, as have several federal district courts).  Attorney General Sessions’ memo certainly does not preempt these rulings.  Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued enforcement guidance stating that the Commission also views gender identity as a protected trait under the Law.

Employers must also be aware of state laws on the issue.  Currently, 19 states’ anti-discrimination laws bar employment discrimination based on gender identity for at least some workers.  Pennsylvania is among those states.  Governor Tom Wolf has signed two executive orders relevant to the subject:  one prohibiting discrimination against state employees based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, or HIV status; the other banning state contractors from discriminating against their LGBTQ employees.  The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has also indicated that it will investigate all complaints of gender identity discrimination in the workplace as a form of unlawful sex bias, including complaints against private sector employers.

While the law regarding transgender individuals’ employment rights remains in flux, employers are well-advised to address the issue with sensitivity and diligence.  Treating transgender employees the same as their similarly situated, non-transgender co-workers remains the best way for all employers to avoid liability for gender identity discrimination.

Most employers take proactive steps to prevent and eliminate workplace harassment. Until recently, courts recognized and rewarded the proactive approach.  Businesses in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware could avoid liability for hostile work environment claims if they rooted out the problem before it became “severe and pervasive.”

Courts had long held that a single slur, even if highly offensive, was not pervasive and therefore could not trigger employer liability.  The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania upheld that standard in Castleberry v. STI Group, a 2015 case involving African American workers who were subjected to a racial slur and threatened with termination in a single incident.  The District Court dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the District’s ruling.  In doing so, the Court noted that the “plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor used a racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African-American co-workers…Within the same breath, the use of this word was accompanied by threats of termination (which ultimately occurred).”  Under these facts, the Third Circuit held that a single, isolated slur constitutes severe conduct that could create a hostile work environment.

Castleberry is now the law of the land for all Pennsylvania employers (and those in New Jersey and Delaware) who are subject to federal anti-discrimination laws. And it is certainly bad news for employers.  The ruling makes it much easier for a hostile work environment plaintiff to survive summary judgment, leading to increased defense costs and greater potential for a costly verdict.

In light of the Third Circuit’s holding, employers would be wise to take inventory of its anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are up to date and prohibit all occurrences of discriminatory harassment. Supervisors and managers should also be made aware that even a single, isolated racial slur can now lead to liability.

We will continue to monitor Third Circuit cases that develop under Castleberry and any updates will be reported here on our blog.

Workplace rights for LGBT individuals has been a rapidly developing area of the law.  A little over two years ago, former President Obama signed an executive order prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.  The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs followed suit by issuing regulations protecting the rights of LGBT workers employed by federal contractors and subcontractors.  Then, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission published guidance suggesting that the Agency considers sexual orientation and gender identity to be protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Despite these developments, no federal appellate court had ever ruled that Title VII protects workers from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  That changed earlier this week.

In a groundbreaking 8-3 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (having jurisdiction in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin), ruled that sexual orientation is a protected trait under Title VII and that employers may not discriminate against employees on that basis.  The case, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, involved an openly lesbian professor who had worked for the college as an adjunct staff member for over fourteen years.  She applied for six different full-time jobs during her tenure and was rejected for each of them.  Then, the college failed to renew her adjunct contract in 2014.  She filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation.

The district court dismissed her case on the basis that sexual orientation was not recognized as a protected trait under Title VII.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.  It held that sexual orientation was a protected characteristic because, in essence, actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a “subset of actions taken on the basis of sex,” which is protected by Title VII.  The Court reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination claims are “no different from the claims brought by women who were rejected for jobs in traditionally male workplaces, such as fire departments, construction, and policing. The employers in those cases were setting the boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found acceptable for a woman (or in some cases, for a man).”

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling is not binding precedent on Pennsylvania employers.  However, as we reported last year, at least one federal district court in the Commonwealth considers sexual orientation to be a protected trait under Title VII.

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling may ultimately prove to have a much broader impact.  The Hively decision now means that circuit courts are officially split on the issue of whether Title VII protections include sexual orientation (last month, the Eleventh Circuit held that sexual orientation and gender identity are not protected under the statute).  When federal circuit courts provide conflicting rulings on the same legal question, the Supreme Court of the United States is more likely to issue its own ruling on the subject in order to ensure consistent application of the law.

We will continue to monitor any future developments on the subject.  As always, we’ll report any updates right here.

In the Third Circuit, an employer’s honest belief that an employee committed misconduct can now serve as a defense to a retaliation claim under the FMLA.  With the recent decision in Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC (found here) the Third Circuit joins the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits in providing such a defense.

In the Capps case, Mondelez (the employer) fired Fredrick Capps (a longtime employee) for what Mondelez believed to be dishonest use of intermittent FMLA leave.  During the time of his employment, Capps suffered from a medical condition that required him to undergo bilateral hip replacement in 2003.  Thereafter, he experienced flare-ups that caused him severe pain, which sometimes lasted for days or weeks at a time. As a result of his condition, Capps requested intermittent FMLA leave to cover his periodic time off work.  Because of his ongoing condition, Capps was recertified for intermittent FMLA leave every six months from 2003 to the end of his employment.

On February 14, 2013, Capps reported that he would not be in to work because he was experiencing pain caused by a flare-up of his condition.  Later that same day, Capps drove to a local pub, where he got something to eat and also had a few beers and shots of alcohol with his friends.  About three hours later, Capps attempted to drive home, but was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”) and spent the night in jail.  After being released from jail the next morning, Capps again called off work using intermittent FMLA leave because he said he was experiencing leg pain from his condition.

When Capps returned to work, he did not report his DUI arrest.  However, over the next several months he called off work numerous times and requested intermittent FMLA leave for his condition.  Interestingly enough, during this same time period, Capps was required to attend court hearings and other appointments related to his DUI charge.

On August 7, 2013, Capps pled guilty to the DUI charge and immediately served 72 hours in jail.  When the employer became aware of Capps’ conviction early in 2014, an investigation commenced looking into Capps’ attendance from the time of his DUI arrest to his guilty plea.  This investigation uncovered that Capps’ arrest date and several subsequent court dates corresponded with days that Capps had also used intermittent FMLA leave.  After further investigation, including discussions with Capps himself, it became clear that the documentation Capps submitted did not support his need for FMLA leave on the days that he also appeared in court.

Subsequently, Capps was discharged based on his violation of the company’s Dishonest Acts Policy and misuse of FMLA leave. The termination letter sent to Capps stated: “You claimed to be out due to [ ] FMLA related issues on multiple dates. The documentation you produced does not support your claim of [ ] FMLA related absences.”  After his termination, Capps filed suit claiming, among other things, that the employer retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the FMLA.

After having his FMLA retaliation claim dismissed on summary judgment, Capps’ argued on appeal that the District Court improperly dismissed his claim because the employer was mistaken in its belief that Capps misused his FMLA leave or was otherwise dishonest. However, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Capp’s FMLA retaliation claim emphasizing that an FMLA retaliation claim requires proof of an employer’s retaliatory intent.  In other words, Capps could not show that the employer’s reasonable belief that he was dishonest and misused his FMLA leave was a pretext for retaliation.

While employers should always proceed with caution before terminating an employee around the time he or she requests, takes, or returns from FMLA leave; the Third Circuit’s adoption of the honest belief defense provides a significant means for employers to defend against FMLA retaliation claims. More specifically, employers that discharge an employee based upon an honest belief that the employee is abusing FMLA leave may now be more likely to prevail on a motion for summary judgement.

To be clear, this case is not a get out of jail free card for employers.  Before the decision is made to terminate, employers must be sure that there is supporting evidence of the employer’s honest belief. In the Capps case, this took the form of a thorough investigation of the employee’s absences along with an opportunity for the employee to explain and support his actions.  Yet, when an employer has supporting evidence and reasonably believes that an employee abused FMLA leave or was otherwise dishonest about the need for such leave, this honest belief will serve as the employer’s defense to a FMLA retaliation claim.

In 2010, two employees filed a claim against their former employer, Robert Half International, Inc., alleging that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). In addition to individual claims, the plaintiffs brought a collective action on behalf of all other similarly situated employees. The plaintiffs, however, had signed employment agreements containing arbitration clauses, which generally required that any dispute arising out of their employment be submitted to arbitration. It was silent as to class-wide claims.

The employer filed a motion to compel the employees to resolve their claims through arbitration on an individualized basis. The court ordered the employees to submit their claims to arbitration but left for the arbitrator to decide whether the claims could proceed on a class basis. The arbitrator subsequently ruled that class arbitration was permitted under the agreements. The employer appealed and argued that the question of whether the employees could submit claims to arbitration on a class-wide basis is one to be decided by the courts, not an arbitrator.

The First Shoe

The Third Circuit agreed. The court first explained that it is generally the province of the courts to resolve “questions of arbitrability.” That is, courts have narrow authority to decide whether or not an arbitration clause applies to particular claims and/or particular parties. On the other hand, arbitrators decide all issues they have been authorized by the parties to resolve. This includes procedural questions, and in traditional litigation, questions of class are procedural in nature. So, in this case, the court was presented with the following question: when an arbitration clause is silent as to arbitration on a class basis, is the permissibility of class arbitration a “question of arbitrability” to be decided by the court, or is it a procedural question to be decided by an arbitrator?

In a precedential opinion issued in 2014, the Third Circuit held that it was a question of arbitrability reserved for the court, because it was an issue of whether the clause applies to particular claims and/or parties. With this ruling, the Third Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the employment agreements authorized class arbitration. On remand, finding no explicit language in the arbitration clauses, and finding no other evidence to the contrary, the district court found that class arbitration was not permitted under the agreement. The employees appealed.

The Other Shoe (sort of)

In a non-binding decision issued at the end of January, the Third Circuit agreed that class arbitration was not permitted. First, the court recognized that “a party may only be compelled to submit to class arbitration if there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, Inc., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). To determine whether the parties agreed to class arbitration in this case, the court first looked for explicit language of authorization, noting that under Third Circuit precedent, “silence regarding class arbitrability generally indicates a prohibition.” Quillion v. Tenet HealthSystems Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012). It found no explicit language. Despite this finding and its precedent concerning the silence of class arbitration, the court did not stop there. It went on to look for implicit authorization elsewhere in the employment agreement. It again found nothing and affirmed that the agreement did not authorize class-wide arbitration.

While this ruling resolves this case and gives guidance moving forward, it does not definitively answer whether the absence of explicit language precludes class arbitration. To the contrary, the court’s analysis suggests that class arbitration could be inferred from other language in the employment agreement. So, going forward, to avoid a court making such an inference – one contrary to your true intent – inclusion of explicit language prohibiting class arbitration remains the best policy. However, you must be aware that the National Labor Relations Board takes the position that explicit prohibitions of class arbitration violate the National Labor Relations Act. Three courts of appeals, among other courts, have disagreed and overturned the Board’s position. Stay tuned, as the Supreme Court of the United States is set to resolve this question later this year.

On November 3, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC, finding that the Trump International Hotel, Las Vegas unlawfully refused to bargain with UNITE HERE International Union after the union won a representation election among the Hotel’s housekeeping, food and beverage and guest service employees.

….In other news, just five days later, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States with the pledges to Make America Great Again, to cultivate more good paying jobs for Americans and to undo much of the agenda of the Obama administration.

Over the past several Presidential transitions, the Human Resources community has become accustomed to the swinging pendulum in the areas of labor and employment law.  We know change is coming.  We’re just not always sure what exactly it will involve.   Everyone remembers the threat of unions being certified on the basis of a card check, right?  That didn’t happen in 2009, but of course quickie elections did.  So making specific predictions on Inauguration Day can be dangerous.   But as the new Administration now has officially taken over, we have to at least try.

Here’s an easy one:  President Trump is unlikely to be appointing what we would call traditional candidates to run the departments and agencies that regulate the American workplace.    While he has nominated some people who have significant governmental service on their resumes, the current list includes a fair share of people with no such experience – – CEOs, philanthropists, investment bankers, a neurosurgeon, even the co-founder of World Wrestling Entertainment.   These appointments do not signal “business as usual” for the federal government, nor did the President who, in his inaugural address, pledged to transfer power from Washington back to the American people.

At first blush, this would portend wholesale rollback of workplace regulations.  Indeed, President Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Labor, fast-food executive Andrew Puzder, has been a critic of substantially increasing the minimum wage and a vocal opponent of the Obama administration’s efforts to make more workers eligible for overtime pay.  And critics have noted similar opposition by other nominees to what has been the recent mission or focus of the agency that they may be leading (See Governor Rick Perry and Betsy DeVos).

But here’s the rub:  a substantial portion of President Trump’s electoral base of support likely will not support the pendulum swinging back in ways that make their workplaces less safe or adversely impact their earnings.  So…this will be a bit more complicated.

What can we say now in January 2017 with confidence?

  • We’re not going to get back all of that time we spent learning the ever changing minutiae of the Affordable Care Act.  But we can certainly anticipate that there will be new regulation impacting employer provided health insurance.
  • We will see change in leadership at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The current EEOC Chair’s term will end in July 2017, and the new Chair will likely fill the now vacant EEOC General Counsel position.   That new leadership is less likely to retain the current EEOC’s focus upon pay equity issues and seeking to expand gender identity and sexual orientation protections through selective litigation.   And let’s not forget the agency’s proposed regulations that would require employers to provide compensation data and hours for all employees as part of the EEO-1 reporting process.  We think that it is unlikely that these requirements will become effective in March 2018, as currently planned.
  • The NLRB will be looking at the bureaucratic version of Extreme Home Makeover.  Readers of our Annual NLRB Year in Review will recall that the Obama Board has involved itself in everything from revising the representation election timeline, to creating rights to use your email system for organizing activity to uncovering the dastardly hidden meaning of the most innocuous provisions of your employee handbook.  They expanded the concept of joint employment to the point you might have to sit at the bargaining table to discuss wages, benefits and working conditions of people who are not even your employees.  And then when they were done with that, they even tried to get involved in college football!  The party’s soon over at the Board.  President Trump will have the opportunity to fill two current Member vacancies on the Board as soon as he gets down to work.  More critically, by November he will have the opportunity to replace NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin Jr., an Obama appointee, former union lawyer and spearhead for most of the NLRB’s most aggressive initiatives.
  • OSHA recordkeeping requirements should be reduced.  We know how this has been an area of focus over the past 8 years and has caused more work for employers.  And the new silica rules and anti-retaliation rules that seek to effectively prohibit mandatory post-accident drug testing and safety incentive programs may soon be on the cutting room floor.

So, that’s enough prognostication on Day 1 of the Trump Administration.  Stay tuned!