Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Blog : Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Lawyer & Attorney : McNees Wallace & Nurick Law Firm : Human Resources, Workplace and Business Law : Harrisburg, Lancaster, Allentown, Lehigh

This post was contributed by Anthony D. Dick, Esq., an Associate and a member of McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Practice Group in Columbus, Ohio.

The number of retaliation-based charges of discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC") has doubled from approximately 18,000 to 36,000 in the last ten years.  Last week, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that surely will cause this trend to continue.  In a unanimous decision, the Court held in Thompson v. North American Stainless (pdf) that an employee who claimed he was terminated because his fiancée engaged in protected activity, could bring a retaliation claim against their mutual employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").

Plaintiff Eric Thompson met and eventually became engaged to Miriam Regalado while both worked for North American Stainless (“NAS”).  Subsequently, Regalado filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming NAS discriminated against her because of her sex. Approximately three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson.  Thompson filed suit, alleging his termination was in retaliation for his fiancée’s protected activity.

Both the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Thompson did not have standing to sue for retaliation under Title VII because he had not engaged in any protected activity under the law.  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plain language of Title VII did not contemplate third-party retaliation claims.  The statute specifically provides that:  “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.” 

In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court determined that NAS’s alleged conduct was prohibited by Title VII.  The Court ruled that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII must be construed broadly to prohibit any employer action that would “have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”  Applying this rule, the Court found that a reasonable employee certainly would be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that the consequence would be her fiancé’s termination from the company.

NAS argued unsuccessfully that this standard will force employers into an unenviable position of having to try to identify whether an employee who is about to be terminated has a close relationship with someone who recently engaged in protected activity before taking an adverse action that could expose it to a third-party retaliation claim.  In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that, "[a]lthough we acknowledge the force of this point, we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VII." 

The Court refused to articulate a bright-line rule concerning how close a relationship must be to afford third-party retaliation protection, stating in pertinent part, “[w]e expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.”

In analyzing Thompson’s standing to sue under Title VII, the Supreme Court went on to find that the term “person aggrieved” under the statute includes a plaintiff who falls within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by Title VII.  Thus, if Title VII “arguably sought” to protect that person’s rights, he or she has standing under Title VII; however, if the individual has interests that are only “marginally related to or inconsistent” with the purposes of law, no standing to sue exists.

According to the Supreme Court, Thompson had standing to pursue his own retaliation claim against NAS because he fell within the amorphous “zone of interests” contemplated by Title VII.

It should be clear that this case expands the bounds of employers’ potential liability under Title VII.  Now, more than ever, employers should use caution when taking adverse action against an employee whose spouse, family member, domestic partner or fiancé(e) recently engaged in protected activity.  And, as always, employers should document the specific reasons for employee terminations and follow established company policies to limit later arguments by a terminated employee that he or she was terminated because of a retaliatory motive on the part of the employer.

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Oftentimes, it seems like the requirements of the law conflict with long held workplace beliefs, and in some cases common sense. One staple of workplace dogma is the notion that employees should always bring issues to supervisors first, so that issues can be addressed, and hopefully resolved, at the lowest possible level. According to the law, however, when it comes to discriminatory harassment, supervisors should be left out of the loop.

A recent case, Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.(PDF), illustrates this point. In JetBlue, the Company had a policy that allowed employees to bring complaints to their immediate supervisor, Human Resources, or any member of management. The plaintiff, a former employee at the time she filed her suit under Title VII, alleged that her former supervisor had created a hostile work environment by, among other things, making sexual comments, grabbing her and other women, and tickling women. While she was employed, the Plaintiff only complained about this alleged harassment to the supervisor.

The Company argued that reporting the harassment only to the supervisor, the same person engaging in the alleged misconduct was not reasonable, and therefore, the Company was entitled to rely on the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to discriminatory harassment claims. The Faragher/Ellerth defense is a defense against liability that is available to employers in certain circumstances if two conditions are met. First, the employer must take reasonable measures to prevent and quickly correct any harassing conduct; and second, the employee must unreasonably fail to take advantage of the preventative or corrective measures available. The trial court agreed with the Company that the former employee's failure to report the alleged harassment to another point of contact was unreasonable, and dismissed her harassment claim.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected the Company's argument. The Court of Appeals stated that the former employee's allegations made out an actionable hostile work environment claim based on sex, and went on to hold that employees do not have to shop around for someone to address their complaints. Instead, whether an employee reasonably took advantage of the employer's complaint reporting procedure will be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Court of Appeals determined that in this case, a jury could find that the former employee's actions were not unreasonable because she was following the Company policy by reporting the conduct to her supervisor.

There were some additional facts in this case that were detrimental to the Company's argument. However, it still provides a reminder that insufficient harassment policies will prevent employers from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, which is a means for having harassment claims dismissed. The Gorzynski decision makes it more difficult to get harassment claims dismissed early, because the Faragher/Ellerth defense will now be judged on a case-by-case basis, at least in the Second Circuit.

Even though this decision is not controlling in Pennsylvania courts, Pennsylvania employers should take time to review their discriminatory harassment policies, including sexual harassment policies, and ensure that supervisors are not designated as a reporting point of contact. Instead, reporting points of contacts should be limited to Human Resource staff and upper management personnel, and employees should be directed to utilize alternative points of contact if one point of contact is the alleged harasser.
 

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