Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Blog : Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Lawyer & Attorney : McNees Wallace & Nurick Law Firm : Human Resources, Workplace and Business Law : Harrisburg, Lancaster, Allentown, Lehigh

This post was contributed by Christopher Gibson, a Summer Associate with McNees Wallace and Nurick LLC.  Mr. Gibson will begin his third year of law school at Wake Forest in the fall, and he expects to earn his J.D. in May 2012. 

With unemployment in the United States hovering around 9.2%, human resources offices across the country are being bombarded with job applications like never before. The overworked employees of these often understaffed offices are charged with wading through a figurative sea of applications, all while dealing with the increasingly zany behavior of some applicants. According to CBS News, "[o]ne man sent a shoe to his prospective employer with a note that read, 'I want to get my foot in the door.' " Another "handed out personalized coffee cups, so no one would forget his name." In this high stress environment, some human resources professionals might see using social media as a quick and easy way of separating the wheat from the chaff – narrowing the field of possible applicants significantly in a short amount of time. But before signing into Facebook or pulling up your favorite search engine, keep in mind the immortal words of Clint Eastwood in Dirty Harry: "You feelin' lucky?"

Every human resources staff member knows that, especially when interviewing a potential new employee, some topics are strictly off limits. Asking one of these "off limits" questions can put your company at serious risk of being sued for discrimination. The trouble is, by resorting to the use of social media, this kind of "off limits" information can be collected from a potential employee even before his or her interview.

Imagine for a moment that you are the director of human resources for a mid-sized paper supply company. You receive around fifty resumes in response to a job posting to fill the position of "Assistant to the Regional Manager." One applicant – Alex Jackson – catches your eye as one of the top applicants for the job. According to Alex's resume, Alex has been working in the paper industry for around six years and has a bachelor's degree in management from a New York Ivy League school. Alex has been published in several trade magazines, is active in the community and has excellent references.

You decide to pull Alex's Facebook profile just to get a better feel for the applicant; what's the worst that could happen, right?

As you expected, what you find is fairly innocuous – Alex is a 42 year old Caucasian female who is very active in the Catholic church. She has recently married and has a one year old son. Two of her recent wall posts read, "Going out to happy hour for the fourth night in a row! Can't stop, won't stop!" and "Please pray for my mother as she recovers from her most recent bout with cancer." Eventually, your organization decides to go in another direction and Alex is not interviewed or hired for the job.

So again, what's the worst that could happen?

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On March 1, 2011, the United States Supreme Court again increased employers' exposure to employment discrimination claims. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. ___ (2011) (pdf), the unanimous Court concluded that employers may be held liable for unlawful discrimination if a lower level supervisor influences an adverse employment decision, even if the decision is ultimately made by an independent manager. The theory that an employer may be liable when it relies on facts supplied by a biased supervisor when making an adverse employment decision is known as the "cat's paw" theory.

Staub claimed that Proctor Hospital's Human Resources (HR) Manager relied on facts supplied by Staub's supervisors, who were acting with anti-military animus in violation of the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), when the HR Manager terminated him. Staub admitted that the HR Manager did not have anti-military animus, but claimed that the facts provided by his supervisors were false, and that his supervisors provided the false facts because the supervisors wanted him fired because of his military Reserve obligations.

The focus of the Court's decision was whether the supervisors' anti-military animus was "a motivating factor in the employer's action," in violation of the USERRA. Importantly, and unfortunately for employers, the Court pointed out that the "motivating factor" language from the USERRA is also found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Therefore, it is clear that the "cat's paw" theory is viable under Title VII.

The Court found that the actions of the supervisors, and the independent actions of the HR Manager, could be aggregated to produce a discriminatory employment action. Because the supervisors were agents of the Hospital, their actions could be imputed to the Hospital. If supervisors are motivated by unlawful discrimination, intend to cause the adverse action, and the intended action actually occurs, then the employer will be liable because the supervisors were acting on behalf of the employer. The decision leaves open the question of whether or not an employer may be held liable if an employment decision is influenced by non-supervisory coworkers.

The Court's "cat's paw" theory requires a showing that: (1) a supervisor; (2) acting within the scope of his or her employment; (3) performed an act that was motivated by discrimination; (4) which was intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action; and (5) the act was a proximate cause of the adverse employment action. If such a showing is made, then the employer may be liable for discrimination.

The cat's paw theory seems strikingly expansive, because the proximate cause element of the theory could expose employers to liability in extremely attenuated circumstances. Therefore, employers must take action now to brace for claims involving the cat's paw theory. First, employers should ensure that their discrimination and harassment policies and procedures are up-to-date, and that they contain adequate reporting mechanisms. All employees must be made aware of the available discrimination reporting procedures.  In addition, these procedures should not require that employees first make reports of discrimination to their immediate supervisors. Please click here to view our prior post on this issue.

Also, if and when an employee reports discrimination, the employer must conduct a thorough investigation and take appropriate action. Employers considering terminating an employee should also conduct a thorough investigation and should attempt to establish the relevant facts independently if possible.  This is true particularly if there have been allegations of discrimination raised against the employee's supervisor before or during the termination process.
 

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The United States Supreme Court decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. creates a rift between the treatment of so called "mixed-motive" cases under the ADEA and Title VII. Under Title VII, an employee may allege that he suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations—i.e., a “mixed-motives” case. If a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a “motivating” or a “ substantial” factor in the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible consideration.

The Supreme Court declined to apply the mixed-motive burden shifting to ADEA cases holding that a plaintiff bringing an ADEA disparate-treatment claim must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.

Congress amended Title VII to explicitly authorize discrimination claims where an improper consideration was “a motivating factor” for the adverse action, see 42 U. S. C. §§2000e–2(m) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B),while leaving the ADEA language unchanged. The Supreme Court viewed this omission as a congressional policy statement and declined to recognize the so called "mixed motive" analysis in ADEA claims. However the Courts' opinion invites Congress to fix the discrepancy by legislatively negating the Court's decision much like it did in with both the ADA Amendments Act and the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act:

Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§2000e–2(m) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, §115, 105 Stat. 1079; id., §302, at 1088.

Expect Congress to harmonize the treatment of Title VII and ADEA claims so that the mixed motive analysis applies to both. Congress should really fix the differentiation between age discrimination cases and other discrimination claims. For some reason unknown to me, Congress placed protections from age discrimination in the Fair Labor Standards Act (governing topics like minimum wage and overtime) rather than just adding "age" to the list of Title VII's protected classifications. As a result, federal age discrimination claims have different rights, procedures, and damages.

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The United States Supreme Court upheld a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to strike down an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, which was freely negotiated by a union and company, and which clearly and unmistakably requires employees to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims. However, the Court declined to rule on specific factual issued related to whether the waiver of discrimination claims under the contract by employees' in this case was clear and unmistakable. It also would not rule on whether the contract waived substantive rights protected by federal law which could not be vindicated in an arbitration. These issues were not properly before the Court.

The decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett has important implications for unionized employers who face employment discrimination charges and lawsuits. These claims may be forced into the arbitration forum and out of court depending on the language in the contract. The scope of the arbitration clause including any limitations will be an important focus of future litigation.

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In its decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson City, the United States Supreme Court considered the scope of Title VII protections from retaliation for employees who act as witnesses in an employer's internal investigation into harassment. The Court held that an employee's involvement in the employer's internal investigation constituted opposition to unlawful employment practices when she responded to her employer's questions in a manner disapproving of accused harasser's sexually obnoxious behavior toward her. The Court's decision unfortunately does not create a bright line standard for employers defining the scope of an employee's involvement in an internal investigation which can trigger protections from retaliation. Employers should tread very carefully in this area.

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The Senate passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 by a vote of 61 to 36 with both Pennsylvania Senators supporting the legislation.   President Obama has previously stated he will sign the law.

The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act redefines the "accrual" of a compensation discrimination claim as follows:

For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.

Violations of the law entitle employees to recover compensatory and punitive damages including recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the charge filing period are similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.

The law is retroactive to the May 28, 2007 (the date of the Supreme Court's Ledbetter decision) effectively reviving all claims that are pending or after that date.

Forces employers to modify their pay practices and evaluation procedures including the following:

• Better justify and document their compensation decisions.
• Review promotion procedures which may fall under the law because of the attendant compensation adjustment.
• Create an institutional memory that captures the basis for compensation and promotion decisions.
• Design a record retention system that allows for the defense of claims.

Next on the Senate Agenda will likely be the Paycheck Fairness Act (S. 182).

Thanks to the Connecticut Employment Law Blog for insights.

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In Makky v. Chertoff, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the importance of objective job qualifications in evaluating the merits of a discrimination claim. Employers that establish clear baseline standards for position through their job descriptions, advertisements and other records are better able to defend discrimination claims by showing that the applicant or employee does not meet minimum qualifications for the position.

The Makky case involved the termination of employment of Dr. Wagih Makky who was employed by the United States government in the Federal Aviation Administration and Transportation Safety Administration for fifteen years. In his various positions, Dr. Makky was required to obtain security clearance. A descendant of Egypt, Makky was the only Muslim and only person of Arab descent in his division. Makky's security clearance was suspended due to safety concerns, including his dual citizenship with Egypt, foreign relatives and associates, foreign countries visited, and alleged misuse of his government computer. Makky was placed on paid administrative and subsequently terminated when the TSA issued its final denial of security clearance. Although Makky appealed the determination through the government's processes, the determination was upheld.

Makky filed a lawsuit including a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Makky's Title VII claim was premised on a mixed motive theory of discrimination which recognizes that an employment decision can at times be based on both (1) a legitimate non-discriminatory reason and (2) discriminatory animus. Here, Makky argued that while he was suspended without pay and terminated because he did not pass the security clearance, the TSA's actions were also motivated by discriminatory animus based on his national origin because the agency did not offer him other positions or keep him on paid leave. Although the Court recognized that the analysis is factually sensitive , it held that when a plaintiff does not possess the objective baseline qualifications to do his or her job, the discrimination claim will fail on its face because he or she cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Applying the holding to the facts at hand, the Court found that Makky's inability to retain a security clearance rendered him expressly unqualified for the TSA position. Analogizing Makky's situation to a more mainstream occupation, the Court explained, "if the hospital employing a person who has been performing surgery learns that the employee falsified his or her qualifications and never went to medical school, that employee could not establish a prima facie mixed-motive case irrespective of allegations of racial or ethnic discrimination."

So what can an H.R. specialist take away from Makky? When a position requires a baseline objective qualification, like a license or degree, make sure it is expressly stated in all hiring materials including: (1) job advertisements; (2) position descriptions; and (3) application materials. Notably, if the degree or license it is merely the company's "preference" for someone in the position, it is important to consider whether making the "preference" appear as a "qualification" may lead to problems in the future. For example, suppose that Company X states that a sales position requires a Bachelor's Degree. When Company X interviews its two top choices, however, the female candidate who possess a Bachelor's Degree has the personality of dry toast, while the male candidate who has waitered all his life and does not have a Bachelor's Degree has a dynamic sales personality and will surely do well with Company X. If Company X believes that the male applicant is better suited for the position than the female applicant, should the Bachelor's Degree have been a required qualification in the first place? Probably not. Accordingly, it is important to have a process in place to review your company's job advertisements and position descriptions before posting for openings. While certain baseline objective qualifications can often be beneficial in refuting a prima facie discrimination claim, turning a mere "preference" into a "qualification" can have the opposite result because it may be used as evidence of a discriminatory motive.

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On July 22, 2008, the EEOC issued a new section of its Compliance Manual addressing the subject of religious discrimination. The section "provides guidance and instructions for investigating and analyzing charges alleging discrimination based on religion." The new section does not change a Pennsylvania employer's legal obligations, imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), as amended, with respect to religious discrimination and accommodation. It does, however, provide a handy reference tool for many religious discrimination issues and offer some insight into the EEOC's current thinking on this often difficult subject. 

As a protected trait under both Title VII and the PHRA, religion may form the basis of disparate treatment, harassment, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims by applicants and employees. The EEOC's new section is divided into five sections reflecting the different types of possible religion discrimination claims:

• Coverage issues, including the definition of "religion" and "sincerely held," the religious organization exception, and the ministerial exception.
• Disparate treatment analysis of employment decisions based on religion, including recruitment, hiring, promotion, discipline, and compensation, as well as differential treatment with respect to religious expression; customer preference; security requirements; and bona fide occupational qualifications.
• Harassment analysis, including religious belief or practice as a condition of employment or advancement, hostile work environment, and employer liability issues.
• Reasonable accommodation analysis, including notice of the conflict between religion and work, scope of the accommodation requirement and undue hardship defense, and common methods of accommodation.
• Related forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on national origin, race, or color, as well as retaliation.

In addition to the standard harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation requirements, the EEOC continues to recognize and enforce the following employer obligations:

• Reasonable Accommodation. Once on notice, an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless providing the accommodation would create an undue hardship. A reasonable religious accommodation can be any adjustment to the work environment or requirement that will allow the employee to practice his religion. Examples of such accommodations may include allowing flexible scheduling, voluntary substitutions or swaps, job reassignments and lateral transfers, and modification of grooming requirements and other workplace practices and rules.
• Undue Hardship. An employer need not accommodate an employee's religious beliefs and/or practices if doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employers' legitimate business interests. The undue hardship defense to providing religious accommodation requires a showing that the proposed accommodation in a particular case poses a “more than de minimis” cost or burden. This standard is far lower than that required for an undue hardship under the ADA, which is defined in that statute as “significant difficulty or expense."
• Religious Expression and Participation. Employers must permit employees to engage in religious expression, unless the religious expression would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Generally, an employer may not place more restrictions on religious expression than on other forms of expression that have a comparable effect on workplace efficiency. Likewise, employees cannot be forced to participate, or not participate, in a religious activity as a condition of employment.

In addition to a description of the applicable legal requirements, the EEOC's new Compliance Manual section on religious discrimination also contains questions-and-answers and "best practices" information designed to assist employers with their compliance obligations. 

The issuance of this new compliance assistance demonstrates that the EEOC remains focused on religious discrimination and accommodation issues. For this reason and numerous others, employers also should be aware of and compliant with these requirements.

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A company’s termination of a female worker's employment for missing work in violation of an attendance policy is illegal discrimination if the termination decision is sufficiently related to the woman’s exercise of her right to an abortion. On May 30, 2008, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Jane Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., and held that:

Clearly, the plain language of the [Pregnancy Discrimination Act], together with the legislative history, and the EEOC guidelines, support a conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman employee because she has exercised her right to have an abortion. We now hold that the [PDA’s] term “related medical conditions” includes an abortion.

The Third Circuit reversed a district court's decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of a company that operated a business insuring used cars. The Third Circuit found that there were issues of fact that must be resolved by a jury, not a judge. 

The decision also noted the following items unique to a pregnancy discrimination case:

• There are three elements to a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination to be proven by an employee:
  • She is or was pregnant and her employer knew she was pregnant
  • She was qualified for her job;
  • She suffered an adverse employment action; and
  • A nexus exists between the pregnancy and the adverse employment action that suggests unlawful discrimination.

The legal analysis for pregnancy discrimination claims follows the rubric set forth for Title VII discrimination claims. Set forth below is a brief overview of the analysis as discussed in Jane Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.

Employee's Prima Facie Case:

• A nexus can be demonstrated by showing that the pregnant employee was treated less favorably that similarly situated non-pregnant employees. Anemployer's more favorable treatment of temporarily disabled non-pregnant workers raises an inference of discrimination.
• A discriminatory motive can be demonstrated by remarks by a company decision maker critical of pregnancy or abortion and by the temporal proximity between the abortion and the employee’s separation from employment.

Employer's Burden of Production:

• An employer may defend a discrimination claim by producinga legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for an employee’s termination. For example, in Jane Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., the employer’s justification for the employee's termination was job abandonment for failing to call in under its absenteeism policy. 

Employee's Burden to Prove Pretext:

• The employee must then show the justification is a mere pretext for discrimination by evidence that either casts doubt upon the employer’s reason as fabricated or shows that discrimination was the employer’s true motivation. The evidence of record in Jane Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., created a material issue of fact regarding whether C.A.R.S.'s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Social views aside, it appears that in the Third Circuit an abortion is now a recognized activity, covered under the PDA, for which an employee cannot be treated differently in the terms and conditions of her employment. Irrespective of an employer's social views, employers must now recognize the differing treatment of employees who have undergone an abortion presents the possibility for claims under the PDA, and most likely the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

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