Supreme Court Issues Highly Anticipated City of Ontario v. Quon Decision

On June 17, 2010 the United States Supreme Court issued the highly anticipated decision City of Ontario v. Quon (pdf). The case was closely watched by many in the human resources and employment law spheres because it was thought that the case would shed valuable light on employees' privacy rights in the area of employer-provided electronic devices. The Court admitted that the case raised issues of "far-reaching significance," but nonetheless unanimously decided the case on previously established legal principals, and left many questions unanswered.

Quon was appealing for many reasons, not the least of which were the facts of the case. In 2001, the City of Ontario, California, Police Department issued members of the SWAT team two-way pagers in an effort to help the team mobilize and respond to emergencies quickly. The City had a contract with Arch Wireless Operating Company (Arch), also a party to the litigation, to provide wireless services for the pagers. The City's "Computer Usage, Internet, and E-Mail Policy" applied to text messages sent via the pagers, and the policy specifically put employees on notice that they should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality.

Quon and other officers exceeded the monthly text message limit many times, but a Lieutenant informed Quon, and others, that if they paid for the excess text messages, he would not audit the text message records to determine whether the excess messages were work-related or personal. Quon and other officers took advantage of this opportunity and paid for the excess text messages. After several months, the Chief of Police determined that an audit should be conducted to determine whether the text message limit was too low, or whether the officers were using the pagers for personal reasons too often. The audit revealed that Quon was "sexting" his wife and his mistress while on duty. Presumably, Quon was disciplined for his actions.

Quon and others filed suit against the City, the Department and the Chief, alleging that the audit violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Quon also filed suit against Arch, alleging a violation of the Stored Communications Act, because Arch turned over the transcripts of the text messages to the Chief. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court (pdf) and held that the City, the Department and the Chief did in fact violate Quon's Fourth Amendment rights, and held that Arch violated the Stored Communications Act by turning over the text transcripts.

The Supreme Court agreed to review the case only on the Fourth Amendment issue, and therefore, the Stored Communications Act judgment against Arch Wireless remains intact. The Court made many assumptions in its decision, and therefore failed to answer many questions presented by the case. Instead, the Court focused on one narrow issue, i.e. whether the search was "reasonable," to determine the outcome. The Court determined that the review of Quon's text messages was reasonable, and therefore, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

In order to be reasonable, a public sector employer's work-related search must be justified before the search, and the search must be reasonably related to the justification and cannot be excessively intrusive. The Court held that the search of Quon's records was justified because many officers exceeded the text message limit, and the Chief needed to determine whether that was because the limit was too low, or because the officers' personal usage was too high. The Court also concluded that the scope of the search was appropriately limited. Importantly, the Court noted that it would not have been reasonable for Quon to have concluded that his messages were in all circumstances immune from review. Thus, the search was justified and not excessive, and therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

While the Quon decision was highly anticipated for many reasons, including the interesting facts and the potentially far-reaching implications of any decision outlining employees' privacy rights in the workplace, it left many observers wanting more. The decision did leave the door open for both employees and employers to further define the landscape of employees' privacy rights in the workplace, and dropped clues as to what the Court will consider when the issue of employee privacy appears again.

In addition, the decision was important for public sector employers that provide electronic communication devices to employees. Public sector employers are permitted to "search" electronic records when the search is justified and appropriately limited in scope to the justification. In other words, although not every search is permissible, a well-justified and well-tailored search will not be found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, all employers, public and private, should make certain that supervisors and managers are properly trained regarding policies related to electronic resources and devices to ensure that they are not waiving any of the employer's rights to enforce the policy. Therefore, all employers should review the Court's decision and determine what, if any, policy and procedure changes are necessary. 

U.S. Supreme Court Issues Unanimous Opinion Allowing African-American Firefighters To Sue City Of Chicago Asserting Racial Discrimination Disparate Impact Claims

This post was contributed by Bruce D. Bagley, Esq., a Member in McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Practice Group.

It's not often that all nine members of the U.S. Supreme Court agree on the disposition of an employment law matter, but that's what happened in Lewis v. City of Chicago, issued on May 24, 2010 (No. 08-974) (pdf)

The City of Chicago gave a written test in 1995 to 26,000 applicants for firefighter positions. In January 1996, the City notified the applicants of their test results, and depending on their scores, applicants were designated well-qualified (scoring 89 or above), qualified (scoring between 65 and 88), or not qualified (scoring below 65). They were further informed that only the well-qualified were likely to be hired but that the list of those who were merely qualified would be retained in case the well-qualified list was exhausted as positions were filled.

On March 31, 1997, Crawford Smith, a Black applicant who had scored in the qualified range and had not been hired, filed an EEOC Charge along with five other similarly situated applicants. They alleged that the City's practice of hiring only applicants who scored over 89 had a disparate impact on Black applicants. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is unlawful, unless the employer can demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Smith argued that since he was deemed qualified there was no job-related reason to limit hiring to those who scored over 89.

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice and the applicants filed suit in federal district court. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the applicants had waited too long to file with the EEOC. There is a 300 day limitations period under Title VII for filing with EEOC, and in this case the Charge was filed more than a year after the applicants had received their test results. But, the City hired applicants from the well-qualified pool during the 300 day period prior to the filing of the Charge, and continued to periodically hire from the pool as additional fire fighters were needed.

At the district court level, Crawford and the other applicants prevailed. The court denied the City's summary judgment motion, finding that the City's "ongoing reliance" on the 1995 test results constituted a continuing violation under Title VII. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that "the hiring only of applicants classified 'well-qualified' was the automatic consequence of the test scores rather than the product of a fresh act of discrimination." The Court of Appeals found that the applicants should have filed their Charge with EEOC within 300 days of receiving the test results.

The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court. Even if a plaintiff does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice, the Court stated, the plaintiff may nevertheless assert a disparate impact claim in a timely charge challenging the employer's application of that practice. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Scalia was unmoved by arguments from the City and its amici (or "friends of the court") that employers could now face disparate impact suits for practices they have used regularly for years, noting "…it is not our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted."

It is fair to say that few observers would have predicted such a unanimous holding in this matter by the Court. Could the Court have been influenced by Congress' enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, reversing the Court's 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber (pdf)? In Ledbetter the Court had held a gender-based discrimination claim was not timely filed where the employee claimed her wage disparity with male co-workers resulted from personnel decisions made years earlier.

In any event, employers must now devote even greater attention to determining whether seemingly benign practices such as relying on higher test scores may disproportionately impact members of a protected class. Years can go by but each time the employer applies that practice employees will have a fresh 300 day period in which discrimination allegations can be raised.