United States Supreme Court Clarifies Public Employee Petition Clause Protections

Posted on August 30, 2011 by Adam Santucci

This post was contributed by James Welch, a Summer Associate with McNees Wallace and Nurick LLC. Mr. Welch will begin his third year of law school at William & Mary School of Law in the fall, and he expects to earn his J.D. in May 2012.

In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 113 S.Ct. 2488 (2011) (PDF), the United States Supreme Court clarified that, although the Petition Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides public employees separate and distinct protections, those protections are essentially the same as those afforded by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  This is good news for public sector employers, who already face a slew of additional concerns in the area of employee discipline. 

The Petition Clause has been trendy for public employees lately, but its contours have been somewhat unclear.  Generally, the Petition Clause protects the rights of individuals to petition the government to seek redress of grievances.  The courts have held that this provision protects public employees who file grievances against their employers.  In other words, public employers are prohibited from retaliating against an employee who has filed a grievance or other complaint. 

However, like other protections afforded to employees, there are limits to the protections afforded by the Petition Clause.  The issue in Guarnieri was, what types of grievances/complaints are protected? 

The Court held that the protections afforded by the Petition Clause are the same as those afforded by the Free Speech Clause.  Generally, the Free Speech Clause protects public employees who speak as citizens on matters of public concern, unless the speech infringes on the governmental employer's operations.  In Guarnieri, the Court clarified that, under both the Petition Clause and the Free Speech Clause, complaints about merely personal issues are not shielded from discipline.  Essentially, public employees are not protected when they advance merely personal issues, including grievances that related to personal matters. 

This decision was good news for employers, because even though it may be difficult to determine whether a particular complaint is protected, the Court declined to adopt a more expansive view of the protections afforded by the Petition Clause.  The decision allows public employers to rely on the rules they already know when evaluating the protections afforded to public employees by the First Amendment. 

The Guarnieri decision is also a good reminder to public employers to review policies that may implicate employees' constitutional rights, such as social media policies, to ensure compliance. 
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First Amendment Free Speech Protections Limit University's Enforcement of its Sexual Harassment Policy

Posted on August 4, 2008 by Michael Moore

A Federal Appeals Court in Philadelphia enjoined Temple University from enforcing its “facially overbroad” sexual harassment policy because some speech that creates a “hostile or offensive environment” may be protected speech under the First Amendment. In DeJohn v. Temple University, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a public university’s Policy on Sexual Harassment that reads like that of many private employer’s, finding fault with the italicized language:

For all individuals who are part of the Temple community, all forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including the following: an unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual favors,  or other expressive, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature when… (c ) such conduct has the purpose and effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work, educational performance, or status; or (d) such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.

The court found three areas of the policy language that were overboard so as to potentially stifle protected free speech:

  • The phrase “gender-motivated nature” is too indefinite taking into account the speaker’s motivations not limiting only the affect of speech and possibly inhibiting expression of a broad range of social issues. The Court also cautioned that “we must be aware that ‘gender’ to some people, is a fluid concept.”
  • The phrase “conduct which has the purpose and effect of unreasonably interfering” is too broad as it prohibits speech that “intends” to cause disruption. The university may only prohibited speeches that it reasonably believes will actually and materially disrupt the learning environment. (Interestingly, the “purpose and effect” language used by the EEOC.)
  • The phrase “unreasonably interfere[s] with an individual’s work” is too restrictive because it may encompass speech that creates a hostile or offensive environment but is protected nonetheless. A policy may prohibit speech that “substantially” interferes by using an additional standard like “severe and pervasive.”

Many employees in the private sector believe they have a constitutional right to say whatever they want in the workplace.  This is not the case and employees in the private sector may be disciplined for violating workplace conduct standards.

Private employers are not subject to the free speech protections of the First Amendment.  They can also take solace in the fact that a federal court is less likely to wordsmith their employment policies. The case shows the difficulty that all employers face in regulating workplace speech and conduct.  There are obvious challenges in drafting a harassment policy that is not so replete with legalese that is becomes incomprehensible to the workforce.

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