Discrimination & Harassment

On November 3, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in Trump Ruffin Commercial, LLC, finding that the Trump International Hotel, Las Vegas unlawfully refused to bargain with UNITE HERE International Union after the union won a representation election among the Hotel’s housekeeping, food and beverage and guest service employees.

….In other news, just five days later, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States with the pledges to Make America Great Again, to cultivate more good paying jobs for Americans and to undo much of the agenda of the Obama administration.

Over the past several Presidential transitions, the Human Resources community has become accustomed to the swinging pendulum in the areas of labor and employment law.  We know change is coming.  We’re just not always sure what exactly it will involve.   Everyone remembers the threat of unions being certified on the basis of a card check, right?  That didn’t happen in 2009, but of course quickie elections did.  So making specific predictions on Inauguration Day can be dangerous.   But as the new Administration now has officially taken over, we have to at least try.

Here’s an easy one:  President Trump is unlikely to be appointing what we would call traditional candidates to run the departments and agencies that regulate the American workplace.    While he has nominated some people who have significant governmental service on their resumes, the current list includes a fair share of people with no such experience – – CEOs, philanthropists, investment bankers, a neurosurgeon, even the co-founder of World Wrestling Entertainment.   These appointments do not signal “business as usual” for the federal government, nor did the President who, in his inaugural address, pledged to transfer power from Washington back to the American people.

At first blush, this would portend wholesale rollback of workplace regulations.  Indeed, President Trump’s nominee for Secretary of Labor, fast-food executive Andrew Puzder, has been a critic of substantially increasing the minimum wage and a vocal opponent of the Obama administration’s efforts to make more workers eligible for overtime pay.  And critics have noted similar opposition by other nominees to what has been the recent mission or focus of the agency that they may be leading (See Governor Rick Perry and Betsy DeVos).

But here’s the rub:  a substantial portion of President Trump’s electoral base of support likely will not support the pendulum swinging back in ways that make their workplaces less safe or adversely impact their earnings.  So…this will be a bit more complicated.

What can we say now in January 2017 with confidence?

  • We’re not going to get back all of that time we spent learning the ever changing minutiae of the Affordable Care Act.  But we can certainly anticipate that there will be new regulation impacting employer provided health insurance.
  • We will see change in leadership at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  The current EEOC Chair’s term will end in July 2017, and the new Chair will likely fill the now vacant EEOC General Counsel position.   That new leadership is less likely to retain the current EEOC’s focus upon pay equity issues and seeking to expand gender identity and sexual orientation protections through selective litigation.   And let’s not forget the agency’s proposed regulations that would require employers to provide compensation data and hours for all employees as part of the EEO-1 reporting process.  We think that it is unlikely that these requirements will become effective in March 2018, as currently planned.
  • The NLRB will be looking at the bureaucratic version of Extreme Home Makeover.  Readers of our Annual NLRB Year in Review will recall that the Obama Board has involved itself in everything from revising the representation election timeline, to creating rights to use your email system for organizing activity to uncovering the dastardly hidden meaning of the most innocuous provisions of your employee handbook.  They expanded the concept of joint employment to the point you might have to sit at the bargaining table to discuss wages, benefits and working conditions of people who are not even your employees.  And then when they were done with that, they even tried to get involved in college football!  The party’s soon over at the Board.  President Trump will have the opportunity to fill two current Member vacancies on the Board as soon as he gets down to work.  More critically, by November he will have the opportunity to replace NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin Jr., an Obama appointee, former union lawyer and spearhead for most of the NLRB’s most aggressive initiatives.
  • OSHA recordkeeping requirements should be reduced.  We know how this has been an area of focus over the past 8 years and has caused more work for employers.  And the new silica rules and anti-retaliation rules that seek to effectively prohibit mandatory post-accident drug testing and safety incentive programs may soon be on the cutting room floor.

So, that’s enough prognostication on Day 1 of the Trump Administration.  Stay tuned!

 

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC”) has been aggressively advancing its position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation even though sexual orientation is not expressly identified as a protected class. More information on the EEOC’s position is available here. Recently, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with the EEOC’s position. In, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Scott Medical Health Center, P.C., U.S. District Judge Cathy Bissoon concluded that discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII.

In its complaint, the EEOC alleged that a former gay male employee who worked for Scott Medical in a telemarketing position, was subject to harassment, anti-gay epithets and a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation.

In support of its arguments to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint, Scott Medical relied heavily on a prior Third Circuit case, Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., which held that Title VII protections could not be extended to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Despite this clear precedent, the court in Scott Medical stated that, “[i]ncremental changes have over time broadened the scope of Title VII’s protections of sex discrimination in the workplace” and “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is, at its very core, sex stereotyping plain and simple.” The court went on to say that “[t]here is no more obvious form of sex stereotyping than making a determination that a person should conform to heterosexuality.”

Judge Bissoon relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, wherein the Supreme Court concluded that an employer who treats a woman differently on the basis of a belief that women should not be or cannot be aggressive, has engaged in sexual stereotyping and discrimination on the basis of gender. Judge Bissoon used this reasoning from Price Waterhouse to conclude that “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a subset of sexual stereotyping and thus covered by Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination ‘because of sex’.”

So, what happens now based on the court’s decision in Scott Medical Health Center? Well, initially the case will proceed toward trial and an appeal to the Third Circuit may be forthcoming in the future. If appealed, the Third Circuit will likely be faced with reconsidering its prior decision in Bibby and other similar cases. Likewise, other courts throughout the country will be considering this same issue in the near future as the EEOC continues to champion the theory that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In the meantime, employers should take a hard look at their Equal Employment Opportunity and Anti-Harassment policies, and consider adding sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. In addition, employers will need to response appropriately in the event of a complaint alleging harassment based on sexual orientation. It may also be a good idea to update your management training on this topic.

Employers with more than 100 employees and federal contractors are probably more than familiar with the EEO-1 reporting requirements, but those requirements are about to change. On July 13, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission published a revised version of a proposed rule to broaden the scope of data collected in the EEO-1 report. Earlier this year, the EEOC issued an initial version of the proposed rule, which would have required additional reporting on each of ten categories of employees and pay information reported by race and gender.  The July 13 version of the rule contained some key changes.

Changes to Proposed Rule

Under the new proposal, the EEOC will require reporting on an employer’s established pay ranges for positions and hours worked. In response to the comments received regarding the initial proposal, the revised proposal proposes moving the due date for filing the required report from September 30, 2017 to March 31, 2018. This change will allow employers to use employee’s W-2 earnings for reporting. Because of the revisions to the proposal, a new 30 day notice and comment period commenced with the release of the new revised proposal in the federal register.

Purpose of Data Collection

EEOC explained that it intends to use pay data for early analysis of discriminatory complaints. Investigators will examine the data for pay disparities and perform statistical analyses, yet to be determined in order to investigate whether compensation discrimination appears likely. EEOC has further stated that it will compare periodic reports on pay disparities by gender and race based on the data. Finally, the agency will use the data to enhance its support for training programs by, among other things, providing supporting evidence for training programs.

What Should I Do Now

EEOC actually pays attention to the comments it receives as is evidenced by the new revised proposed rule. We strongly encourage employers to make comments on the hardships the proposed revised rule would create. EEOC has remained silent on how it will account for the merit based non-discriminatory factors that could lead to differences in pay in the same job category. This is an issue we suggest employers should press heavily in their comments. Tenure, skill sets and even the broad nature of the job categories themselves can be pivotal in determining wage differences. Stay tuned, we will likely see more changes when the final rule is published.

 

Since the passage of the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), we have received many questions from employers regarding the MMA’s impact on employment law; one of the most frequent questions being – what do I do if an employee tells me he/she is using medical marijuana? While the answer to this question will partly depend on state regulations that have yet to be issued, for now there are a few things that employers should know and do when confronted with an employee who is using medicinal marijuana:

  1. Recognize that only “certified users” are legally permitted to use medicinal marijuana in Pennsylvania. Only individuals who are “certified” under the MMA are authorized to use medical marijuana in Pennsylvania. Because the regulatory framework to implement the certification process has not been implemented, there presently is no mechanism for individuals in Pennsylvania to become “certified.” Until the regulatory framework is in place and certifications are being issued, any employee who reports that he is using medical marijuana is likely violating the law. Until a certification is issued, the employee is not entitled to the protections contained in the MMA, such as the anti-discrimination provision at §2103(b)(1), which we discussed here.
  1. Understand that the MMA does not require employers to accommodate the use of medical marijuana while the employee is at work. The MMA specifically provides “nothing in this Act shall require an employer to make an accommodation for the use of medical marijuana on the property or premises of any place of employment.” §2103(b)(2). For this reason, it appears employers may implement and/or continue to enforce policies that prevent marijuana use at work or on the employer’s premises, regardless of whether the use is certified under the MMA.
  1. Analyze the employee’s situation in accordance with the ADA. Under current interpretations of the law, it appears that the ADA does not prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who tests positive for marijuana, even if the use was prescribed by a doctor. However, the employee who voluntarily discloses medical marijuana use, because the employee has a disability, may be entitled to protection under the ADA. Accordingly, an employer should engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine whether accommodations are warranted. While we strongly recommend that employers seek guidance from counsel in these situations, the following general steps should be followed in all situations:
  • Ask the employee, in writing, to obtain a letter or report from his/her health care provider identifying the condition for which the medicinal marijuana has been prescribed and how, if at all, the employee’s use of medicinal marijuana will impact or impair the employee’s ability to perform his/her job. Providing a copy of the employee’s job description to the health care provider is a best practice.
  • To the extent the employee’s ability to perform his/her job is impacted by the use of medicinal marijuana, assess whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. Remember, this is a fact-specific inquiry that should be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For example, if you would normally provide medical leave to an employee temporarily prohibited from performing his job due to the use of prescription drugs, you may be required to do the same for an employee with a prescription for medicinal marijuana.
  • To the extent an employee’s ability to perform his/her job is not impacted by the use of medicinal marijuana, remind the employee that reporting to work “under the influence” and the use of marijuana at work or on the employer’s premises are strictly prohibited.
  • Continue communicating with your employee to fulfill your obligations to interact under the ADA.

Naturally, if you have specific questions about the MMA and its impact on your workplace, please don’t hesitate to call any member of our Labor and Employment Law Practice Group for further guidance. As the Pennsylvania Department of Health begins to implement temporary regulations, we will keep you apprised of further developments.

The EEOC has recently issued guidance addressing a variety of issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

What is unique about this recent guidance is that the materials, entitled “Legal Rights for Pregnant Workers Under Federal Law,” “What You Should Know: Equal Pay and the EEOC’s Proposal to Collect Pay Data,” and “Helping Patients Deal with Pregnancy-Related Limitations and Restrictions at Work,” are directed at employees and physicians rather than employers. However, this guidance certainly offers a trove of helpful information that employers may rely on when necessary.

For instance, in “Legal Rights for Pregnant Workers”, the EEOC provides guidance regarding the employee’s right to an accommodation of any restrictions that may result from a pregnancy, particularly in the nature of altered break and work schedules, permission to sit or stand, ergonomic office furniture, shift changes, elimination of marginal job functions and/or permission to work from home. However, the guidance also notes instances in which accommodations would be unreasonable and therefore, unnecessary. Being primed to discuss some of those issues as part of the interactive process and referencing the guidance’s conclusion that “the ADA doesn’t require your employer to make changes that involve significant difficulty or expense” and that “if more than one accommodation would work (to address your restrictions), the employer can choose which one to give you” may help keep the employee engaged and effective in the workplace.

The materials directed at physicians are also helpful for employers, particularly because it can easily be attached to correspondence to the physician when requesting additional information about a potential employee accommodation issue. Employers often have to follow up with physicians because an initial request for accommodation comes in the form of a note scrawled on a prescription pad, with no explanation of the condition, the reason for the accommodation, and how the accommodation will address the circumstances of the condition. The EEOC’s resource should be of assistance to employers on these issues, where it notes that documentation from a physician is most helpful where it includes:

  • The nature of the patient’s condition. State the patient’s pregnancy-related medical condition.
  • The patient’s functional limitations in the absence of treatment. Describe the extent to which the medical condition would limit a major life activity (e.g., lifting, bending or concentrating), or a major bodily function (e.g. bowel or circulatory functions), in the absence of treatment or any other accommodation. If the symptoms of the condition come and go or are in remission, describe the limitations during an active episode. It is sufficient to establish substantial limitation of one major life activity or major bodily function.
  • The need for an accommodation. Explain how the patient’s medical condition makes changes at work necessary. For example, if your patient needs an accommodation to perform a particular job function, you should explain how the patient’s symptoms – as they actually are, with treatment – make performing the function more difficult. If necessary, ask your patient for a description of her job duties. Also explain to the employer why your patient may need an accommodation such as a schedule change (e.g., to attend a medical appointment during the workday.) Limit your discussion to the specific problems that may be helped by an accommodation.
  • Suggested Accommodation(s). If you are aware of an effective accommodation, you may suggest it. Do not overstate the need for a particular accommodation in can an alternative is necessary.

This language, at least, can be cited by employers in their correspondence to physicians regarding accommodations requests to better help advance these discussions quickly.

The Pay Data guidance relates to the recent proposal to begin collecting summary pay data by gender, race and ethnicity, and again is generally directed at employees to explain their rights to equal pay and how to enforce those rights. However, the one piece of additional news for employers is that the EEOC is continuing to pursue the revision of the EEO-1 for the collection of pay data and, sometime during this summer, will be submitting revisions for a second comment period before the proposal for data collection is finalized. We will keep you posted on this initiative.

On June 14, 2016, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) released its updated final rule regarding sex/gender discrimination. The stated purpose of the update was to revise OFCCP’s decades old guidance which was, at some level, in conflict with certain new principles currently espoused by EEOC. For example, OFCCP’s old rule required covered contractors to provide separate bathrooms for men and women.

Oh how times have changed!

The new rules do some reiterate well-known requirements that personnel actions may not be taken on the basis of gender. The rule also reminds contractors that distinctions between married and unmarried persons in the workplace, without applying them equally to men and women, are unlawful.

With respect to gender identity, the rule explains that contractors may not make facilities and employment-related activities available only to members of one sex. Significantly, the rule provides that if a contractor provides showers, changing rooms, restrooms or other similar facilities, the contractor must provide same sex or single user facilities as well. The rule goes on to state that employers must allow employees to use the facilities consistent with the gender with which they identify. It also makes it unlawful to discriminate against applicants based on the applicant’s receipt of “transition-related medical services.”

The final portion of the rule covers some nonbinding best practices recommended by OFCCP including avoiding the use of gender-specific job titles such as foreman or linemen.

While the revised rule addresses a number of other issues regarding sex discrimination, harassment and pay discrimination, the revisions related to gender stereotypes and gender identity seem to be the largest change. The rules are effective August 14, 2016. They apply to all covered government contractors with contracts of $10,000 or more. The final rule is available here.

Covered contractors should note that the rules will likely require some changes to their restroom facilities and should plan accordingly. As always, the true impact of these rules will not be fully understood until courts begin to rule on their implementation. Stay tuned.

Just as the Commonwealth Court seemed to know we would be discussing the work-relatedness of injuries that occur on an employer’s premises, so too did the EEOC anticipate our presentation entitled “Your Leave is Giving Me a Migraine” by issuing guidance on May 9, 2016 addressing “Employer Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act.”

The guidance, which discusses the question of when and how leave is to be provided in cases of an employee’s disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, makes several key points for employers that we also raised at the McNees Labor seminar:

  • If an employer has a leave policy, such as sick, vacation, extended, or otherwise, and whether paid or unpaid, a disabled individual must be permitted to use this existing leave in the same way any other employee would use it. Importantly, if an employee asks for leave under this policy and an employer would not normally request a doctor’s note for use by any other employee, the employer cannot require it of the disabled employee as a condition of the leave.
  • In the absence of a leave policy and/or where leave has been exhausted, additional leave can be a reasonable accommodation. As noted by the EEOC, the “purpose of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation obligation is to require employers to change the way things are customarily done to enable employees with disabilities to work.” An employer cannot assert that it does not provide leave or the leave provided has been exhausted as a defense to a leave request and/or the ultimate claim that the ADA has been violated.
  • Anytime leave is requested as an accommodation, an employer should consider whether or not or under what circumstances it could be granted; such leave does not have to be paid leave. However, leave should only be refused where the employer has determined that providing additional leave will constitute an undue hardship to the employer.
  • Because the employer should generally refuse leave only where it presents an undue hardship, policies that provide for a maximum amount of leave, after which an employee would be automatically terminated, do not satisfy an employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process and undue hardship analysis. As much as we as employers and attorneys would prefer it, the EEOC has refused to set a bright line rule defining how much leave is too much.
  • Similarly, requiring that an employee be 100% healed before returning to work from a leave of absence could constitute an ADA violation because it fails to take into account whether the employer can perform the functions despite any ongoing limitation with or without a reasonable accommodation. Unless no accommodation exists or the employee poses a “direct threat” in the restricted capacity, the employer must consider reassignment and other alternatives to the application of the 100% healed policy that would allow the employee to return to work. Naturally, this will require the employer to consult with the employee prior to their return as a natural part of the ongoing interactive process mandated by the ADA, and employers can, within reason and considering the circumstances of the leave, engage with the employee during the course of the leave in order to plan for the return to work.
  • In assessing the reasonableness of the need for leave and whether or not it presents an undue hardship, employers can consider leave already taken, the amount of leave being requested, the frequency of the leave if not continuous, the flexibility of the leave in terms of when it is taken if intermittent in nature, whether intermittent leave is predictable or unpredictable, the impact on coworkers and/or the duties can still be performed in an appropriate and timely manner, and the impact on the employer’s operations and ability to serve its customers. No one factor is controlling, and each of these factors is wholly unique to each individual case.

The takeaway here is that communication is key. This includes communication with employees requesting leave about the nature of and need for the leave as well as expectations regarding the return to work, and it also includes communication with managers and supervisors about the effect of the leave, and communication with decision-makers about policy modifications. Policies must also allow for communication, employers must ensure that the communication occurs in each case, and employers also have to consider each request individually in order to avoid ADA concerns.

On May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the filing period for constructive discharge claims, which can be filed pursuant to many different employment laws, begins to run upon an employee’s resignation as opposed to the employer’s act that triggered the resignation. In Green v. Brennan, the plaintiff was employed as a postmaster in Colorado. When he was denied a promotion that was given to another employee with less seniority and (allegedly) inferior qualifications, he filed a complaint alleging that racial discrimination motivated the employer’s decision. After filing the complaint, the plaintiff believed he was subjected to increased criticism and accusations in the workplace.

In an attempt to resolve the mounting workplace issues, the plaintiff was given six months of paid leave. In exchange, however, the plaintiff was presented with two choices upon expiration of his leave; accept a demotion to an office hundreds of miles away to a position that paid considerably less or resign from employment. The plaintiff elected a third option. He resigned and filed a constructive discharge complaint, but not until five months after his resignation date.

The employer argued that the suit was untimely, claiming that the last discriminatory act (the deal wherein the plaintiff was given leave in exchange for his resignation) triggered the filing period, which had lapsed before the complaint was filed. The plaintiff argued that his resignation triggered the filing period thereby rendering his complaint timely.

In siding with the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that the filing period on a constructive discharge claim does not begin to run until the date of the employee’s resignation. Specifically, the court noted that resignation is a necessary element in a constructive discharge case, and therefore, the claim cannot be brought until after an employee resigns. The Court also clarified that the filing period begins to run on the date that the employee tenders their resignation as opposed to the last date of employment.

For Pennsylvania employers, the impact of this case is straightforward. An employee now has 300 days after giving notice of their resignation to bring a discrimination-based constructive discharge claim.

For government employers, disciplining and terminating employees can be especially difficult. Not only does the public employer face the same challenges in complying with the standard alphabet soup of employment laws that private employers do, including the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, Title VII, etc., they also have the complicated task of considering the application of an employee’s Constitutional rights in making employment decisions. Unfortunately, the protections provided by the constitution to government employees don’t rely on the kinds of “immutable” traits often in issue in the alphabet soup context, which means that determining when constitutional rights could be violated is particularly troublesome.

Recently, in Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the United States Supreme Court brought the analysis applicable to First Amendment retaliation claims closer to your typical alphabet soup case in one small way – focusing on the employer’s intent. In a typical discrimination context, the employer’s intent is key when examining the reason given for the action and the circumstantial evidence that may call that stated reason into question. In short, the question is: was it the employer’s intent to discriminate in disciplining an employee, or was it really the employee’s violation of an employer policy?

In the First Amendment context, employer intent is usually irrelevant or assumed; the focus instead is on whether the speech or activity is personal or on a matter of public interest, whether the employee acted as a citizen or an employee, and how the speech or activity could harm the government’s interests. Heffernan, however, presented the unique situation where the employee contended he didn’t intend to speak or act at all, but the employer punished him for its perception that he had. The Court therefore faced the following question: whose intent is more significant in the constitutional rights context? The Heffernan Court found that it is the employer’s intentions that are critical to determining whether there has been a violation of the employee’s rights.

In reaching this decision, the Court considered the following facts: Jeffrey Heffernan was employed as a police officer for the City of Paterson in 2005 under Chief of Police James Wittig. Both the Chief and Heffernan’s direct supervisor had  been appointed to their positions by the Mayor, who was running for reelection. During the campaign, Heffernan’s colleagues spotted him at campaign headquarters talking with campaign workers and holding a campaign sign for the Mayor’s opponent, who was a known friend of Heffernan. When word reached his supervisors, Heffernan was demoted from a detective position to a patrol officer position, and given an undesirable patrol post, allegedly to punish his involvement in the opposition’s campaign.  Heffernan denied being involved in the campaign, and denied supporting the candidate, stating that he was only picking the sign up for his mother, who was bedridden and could not do it for herself.

In response to his demotion, Heffernan filed a lawsuit against the City contending that he had been demoted because the City believed he engaged in conduct that constituted protected activity, even though he denied that he had intended to speak or act.

Prior case law is very clear that government employers are prohibited from making an employment decision because an employee supports a particular political candidate. However, Heffernan was contending that he didn’t actually support the oppositional candidate, but the City mistakenly believed he did. The City’s position in the litigation was that, since he hadn’t intended to engage in protected activity, his activity wasn’t protected…and its demotion decision could therefore only violate his rights if in fact he actively supported the candidate.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the government’s reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts…When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects (even if the employee did not intend to engage in that activity), the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment…” Whether the employer has correctly or incorrectly deduced the employee’s motives in engaging in particular behavior, the Court opined that the same constitutional harm would result – an employee would be demoted or terminated for appearing to engage in protected activity, thereby discouraging other employees from engaging in what should be protected activity. Because the harm would result regardless of the accuracy of the employer’s belief, the employer’s reason for the employment action must govern in determining if a First Amendment cause of action and violation exists.

Unfortunately for Heffernan, his fight with the City will continue on, as the Supreme Court did not reach the ultimate question of whether his rights had been violated. To the contrary, the Court’s decision remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether or not Heffernan’s demotion occurred pursuant to an existing neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign, and whether such a policy complies with constitutional standards generally.

The immediate take-away for government employers and elected officials (and the HR personnel who love them), in light of the Heffernan decision should be on the reinforcement of what we know already from other employment discrimination cases: we must examine the reason for an employment decision before it is made to ensure there is  no protected classification or protected activity motivating the decision. Even if the employer is  wrong about what the employee intended by his actions, a decision motivated by an intent to punish what would otherwise be protected activity could violate the constitution.

The federal government’s enforcement efforts relating to equal pay are intensifying after President Obama’s recent announcement that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) will begin to collect expanded information on pay data and hours worked from employers with 100 or more employees completing the annual EEO-1 form.

As we have previously reported on this Blog, the Obama Administration has taken unprecedented action over the past two years to increase the number of requirements imposed upon companies with federal contracts or subcontracts. These requirements have ranged from increasing the minimum wage for employees of federal contractors/subcontractors to $10.10/hour (now $10.15), new protections for LGBT workers, mandatory paid sick leave, and new regulations regarding pay transparency. Experts expected that the Administration would announce a rule for collection of pay data from federal contractors but most were floored when the President announced on January 29, 2016 that all businesses with 100 or more employees would need to provide pay data to the EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP).

The EEO-1 report is an annual survey completed by most federal contractors and all employers with at least 100 employees. The survey requires employers to provide data on employees by job category, sex, race, and ethnicity. The EEOC announced that beginning with the report due on September 30, 2017, the EEO-1 report will be revised to include expanded information on pay data and hours worked. Pay Data will also be collated based on gender, race, and ethnicity. The new Section of the form can be found here. Per the EEOC, once the information is gathered, the data will be used to investigate discrimination complaints, identify pay discrepancies among males/females and minorities/non-minorities across various industries and job classifications, and to discover discriminatory pay practices. The Commission also intends to aggregate and publish the data in order to allow employers to evaluate their own pay practices to ensure compliance.

Secretary of Labor Thomas E. Perez said that the government cannot ensure equal pay unless it has “the best, most comprehensive information about what people earn.” We sincerely doubt that this new burden will do much to combat pay discrimination and that the information will have no practical utility in combating pay disparities. Those familiar with the EEO-1 form know that employees are divided up into 10 incredibly broad job categories. Within these broad categories, the EEOC has identified 12 pay bands for purposes of government reporting.

Comparing the W-2 wages of employees based on these broad categories, without the opportunity to demonstrate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons or any context for pay decisions, will surely raise a red flag with the EEOC and could result in unnecessary and unproductive investigations. For example, your company might place all engineers into the “Professionals” category. If you have a female engineer who has worked for your company for 5 weeks making $129,000/year and a male engineer who has worked for your company for 5 years making $163,000/year, the EEOC’s metric will surely indicate potential gender discrimination when it is clear that no such discrimination has occurred (because the male has 5 more years of experience than the female).

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