New Pennsylvania Law Imposes Penalties for Misclassification of Independent Contractors in the Construction Industry

Independent contractor arrangements have come under fire lately from both state and federal governments. Pennsylvania recently went a step further, enacting legislation governing independent contractor arrangements in the construction industry. On October 13, 2010, the Construction Workplace Misclassification Act (the “Act”) was signed into law. The Act provides criteria for classifying independent contractors within the construction industry and imposes a variety of penalties for misclassifying employees as independent contractors. 

I. What Are the Criteria for Independent Contractor Classification Under the Act?

The Act specifies that, in order to be properly classified as an independent contractor under the Act, and also for purposes of Workers’ Compensation and Unemployment Compensation, an individual must:

1.       Have a written contract to perform services in the construction industry for remuneration;

2.       Be free from control or direction over the performance of such services – both under the contract and in fact; and

3.       Be engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business with respect to such services.

Further, in order to meet the third part of the requirement, above, the individual must:

·         Possess the essential tools, equipment and other assets necessary to perform the services;

·         Be able to sustain a profit or a loss as a result of performing the services;

·         Perform the services through a business in which he or she has a proprietary interest;

·         Maintain a business location separate from the location of the person for whom he or she performs the services;

·         Previously have performed the services for another while free from direction or control and under a contract of service and in fact; or hold him or herself out as an independent contractor; and

·         Maintain liability insurance during the term of the contract of at least $50,000.

The failure to withhold income taxes or to pay unemployment contributions or workers’ compensation premiums may not be considered as a factor in the independent contractor analysis. 

II. What Constitutes a Violation Under the Act – and What Are the Penalties?

An employer – or an officer or agent of an employer – may be subject to a variety of penalties under the Act if he or she fails to properly classify an individual as an employee for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Law or the Workers’ Compensation Act and fails to provide coverage required under those laws. Penalties may include both civil and criminal sanctions, as well as the possibility of a stop work order. 

Civil penalties can range from $1,000 per violation to $2,500 per violation for first-time and repeat violations, respectively. In addition, a stop-work order may issue as a result of violations of the Act. Such an order requires misclassified individuals to cease work within 24 hours of the order, which may result in the cessation of all of the employer's business operations at each site where a violation occurred. Employers will be subject to an added $1,000-per-day penalty for each day that they conduct business operations in violation of an order. The order will continue until a subsequent court order releases it. 

The Act also provides for criminal penalties. Under the Act, each violation of independent contractor classification requirements will be graded as a second or third degree misdemeanor or a summary offense, depending upon whether the violation is found to be intentional or negligent. A summary offense conviction will require payment of $1,000 or less. 

Importantly, these penalties apply for violations separately – meaning each individual instance of independent contractor misclassification will be considered a separate violation under the Act. In addition, a non-employer third party who intentionally contracts with an employer knowing that the employer intends to misclassify employees also will be subject to the Act’s penalty provisions.

The Act goes into effect on February 10, 2011. In the interim, construction industry employers should carefully review their independent contractor arrangements for compliance with the Act’s criteria and take the necessary steps to ensure compliance on February 10, 2011 – and moving forward.  

Federal Agencies Ease Grandfathering Restrictions Under Health Care Reform Regulations

This post was contributed by Eric N. Athey, Esq., a Member in McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Law Practice Group.

As 2011 approaches, perhaps the biggest compliance issue for employers under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA") is whether it is advisable to retain "grandfathered" status for their health plan.  Our June 17, 2010 blog article discusses the interim federal regulations governing grandfathered status and the "do's and don'ts" for plans that wish to maintain that status.  One of the more controversial provisions in those regulations is the "change of carrier" provision.  Under the interim regulations, a grandfathered health plan loses its grandfathered status if the sponsoring employer enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010.  In other words, for most plans, changing carriers after March 23, 2010, would defeat grandfathered status – even if the benefits available through the new carrier did not change.

The change of carrier provision made little sense for several reasons.  First, it presented an obstacle for employers who sought to obtain more competitive premium rates from other carriers to provide the same or better coverage.  Secondly, it arguably gave additional leverage to insurance carriers when negotiating rate increases, since the loss of grandfathered status was a disincentive for employers to switch plans.  Finally, the restriction did not seem to advance the regulatory goal of containing employee cost-sharing requirements.

Fortunately, the change in carrier provision is now a thing of the past.  On November 17, 2010, the regulating agencies jointly issued an "amendment" to the interim grandfather regulations which effectively removed the change of carrier provision from the regulations.  Importantly, the amendment does not apply retroactively, only prospectively for all such changes that are effective on or after November 15, 2010.  For any plan that enters into a new agreement with a carrier, it is the date on which the coverage becomes effective – not the date on which the plan entered into the new contract or policy – that applies for purposes of this rule.  Thus, this amendment will not apply to plans for which such changes became effective prior to November 15, 2010; those plans still lose their grandfather status under PPACA.

Prospectively, grandfathered group health plans may now change carriers without losing grandfathered status, provided the change does not involve a reduction of benefits or increase in cost-sharing that would defeat grandfathered status under the June 17 regulations.  However, the amendment only applies to group health plans; it does not apply to policies issued on the individual market.  Employers who are presently (or will soon be) considering a change in carriers for their group health plan may now do so without fear of losing grandfathered status by virtue of the change.

If you have any questions regarding the recent amendment to the grandfathering rules or any other aspect of PPACA, please consult our prior posts or contact any of the attorneys in our Labor and Employment Practice Group.

OFCCP Jurisdiction Extended to More Hospitals and Health Care Providers

Today, Rick L. Etter, Esq. and Schaun D. Henry, Esq. of McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Group issued an Employer Alert entitled "OFCCP Jurisdiction Extended to More Hospitals and Health Care Providers."

The Employer Alert discusses the jurisdiction of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), which was recently extended to cover hospitals and other health care providers that provide services to participants of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) TRICARE program.

TRICARE is the federal government's health care program for active duty service members, National Guard and Reserve members, retirees, and their families. TRICARE provides health care services through networks of civilian health care professionals, institutions, pharmacies and suppliers.

To read the Employer Alert click here.
 

NLRB Issues Complaint Over Facebook Posts Mocking Supervisor

In what the National Labor Relations Board's (the "NLRB") Acting General Counsel called a "straightforward case" under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the Hartford Regional Office of the NLRB issued a Complaint (pdf) alleging that an employer illegally terminated an employee who posted disparaging remarks about her supervisor on her personal Facebook page. While the October 27, 2010 Complaint is only an accusation, and not a formal ruling from the NLRB, the repercussions of this action are critically important for both unionized and non-union employers.

Employees of the employer, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., are represented by Teamsters Local 443. One of those employees posted negative, critical comments mocking her supervisor on her personal Facebook page. Other employees commented on the posts, which prompted the employee to make further negative statements. The employee was subsequently terminated by the employer for posting the disparaging comments on the Internet, because the posts violated the employer's social media policy. The NLRB conducted an initial investigation, and determined that there was enough evidence to warrant a hearing to determine whether the employer violated the NLRA.

The Complaint alleges that the termination violated the NLRA's prohibition against punishing employees for engaging in concerted protected activity. The NLRB Regional Director has taken the position that the employee's disparaging comments about her supervisor were protected activity under the NLRA because the employee was discussing her working conditions. Under the NLRA, employers are prohibited from punishing employees for concertedly discussing wages, benefits and other working conditions. In the NLRB's view, the fact that other employees commented on the employee's post meant that there was concerted activity by the employees.

Importantly for both unionized and non-union employers, the Complaint also alleges that the employer's policies were overly broad and restricted employees from discussing working conditions. In the view of the NLRB Regional Director, the policies alone violate the NLRA.

While this matter is only at the Complaint stage, the Complaint itself is an eye-opener for many employers and may be another sign of things to come from the NLRB. On September 9, 2010, we added a post about President Obama's appointments to the NLRB, and the likelihood that the NLRB would continue to pursue a decidedly pro-union agenda.

Unionized and non-union employers alike must be sure to review all of their policies, including their social media and internet posting policies, to ensure that the policies do not restrict employees' abilities to discuss wages, hours and other working conditions. Also, we will continue to provide updates as this case unfolds, so employers should also be sure to check back for further posts.
 

Third Circuit Holds Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Does Not Save Untimely Failure-to-Promote Claims

A recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals allows employers to breathe a sigh of relief. In Noel v. Boeing Co. (pdf), the court concluded that an otherwise untimely discrimination claim, alleging that the employer discriminated against an employee by failing to promote the employee, is not rendered timely by the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (the "Act") (pdf). The court's decision limits the reach the Act, and it is now clear that claims involving discrete acts of discrimination are not covered by the Act.

The decision involved discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act brought by Emmanuel Noel, an African-American employee at Boeing's Ridley Park, Pennsylvania facility. Basically, Noel claimed that Boeing failed to award him off site job assignments, which allowed for higher pay and per diem payments, and failed to promote him to a higher pay grade around September 2003. At that time, two white employees were promoted to a higher pay grade. In March 2005, Noel filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and eventually filed a lawsuit in June 2006. Noel's suit alleged multiple counts of race and national origin-based employment discrimination and retaliation, but the trial court held for Boeing on all counts. Noel appealed only the trial court's finding that his failure to promote claim was untimely.

Under Title VII, an employee in Pennsylvania must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act or it will be deemed untimely. Noel's complaint was filed with the EEOC in March 2005, well beyond the 300 day filing period following the alleged discriminatory promotion decision in September 2003. For this reason, the trial court dismissed his failure to promote claim. On appeal, Noel argued that the Act saved his otherwise untimely failure to promote claim.

The Act, passed by Congress in 2009, was in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., Inc. On January 29, 2009, we posted information regarding the Act and the Court's Ledbetter decision. The Act extended the time line for filing complaints of discrimination and states that "in pay discrimination matters an unlawful employment practice occurs each time an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision." As a practical matter, this means that each time an employee receives a pay check that contains the effects of a discriminatory pay decision, the 300 day countdown for filing a complaint of discrimination with the EEOC is restarted.

Noel argued that the Act's paycheck rule made his claim timely because each time he received his pay check he felt the effects of the 2003 failure to promote decision. The Third Circuit disagreed. The court found that in order for an untimely claim to be saved by the Act, the claim must involve pay discrimination and the plaintiff must point to some discriminatory compensation decision or practice.

The court first held that Noel did not allege a pay discrimination claim because he did not allege that he received less pay for doing equal work. The court noted that the white employees were promoted, and as a result, they were not doing the same work as Noel. The court concluded that this was not a pay discrimination claim, which alleges lower pay for equal work.

The court then went on to address whether a failure to promote claim is a discriminatory compensation decision under the Act. The court concluded that in accordance with the plain language of the Act, only decisions involving compensation are covered, and discrete employment decisions, such as promotion decisions, are not within the scope of the Act. A failure to promote claim is not a discriminatory compensation decision, and therefore Noel's untimely failure to promote claim was not saved by the Act.

The court also found support for its decision in Justice Ginsburg's blistering dissent in the Ledbetter decision, which many believe prompted Congress to pass the Act. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg distinguished discriminatory compensation decisions, which may go undetected by employees for years, and discrete actions which are immediately felt by employees. Justice Ginsburg specifically referenced failure to promote decisions as discrete acts.

The court held that the Act was only intended to save untimely discriminatory pay decisions, and not all employment decisions. The court's rationale and decision should apply to other discrete employment actions, such as demotions and terminations. This is a good sign for employers, who under the Act may face liability for discriminatory pay decisions years or even decades after those decisions are made.