Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Blog : Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Lawyer & Attorney : McNees Wallace & Nurick Law Firm : Human Resources, Workplace and Business Law : Harrisburg, Lancaster, Allentown, Lehigh

This post was contributed by Bruce D. Bagley, Esq., a Member in McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Practice Group.

It's not often that all nine members of the U.S. Supreme Court agree on the disposition of an employment law matter, but that's what happened in Lewis v. City of Chicago, issued on May 24, 2010 (No. 08-974) (pdf). 

The City of Chicago gave a written test in 1995 to 26,000 applicants for firefighter positions. In January 1996, the City notified the applicants of their test results, and depending on their scores, applicants were designated well-qualified (scoring 89 or above), qualified (scoring between 65 and 88), or not qualified (scoring below 65). They were further informed that only the well-qualified were likely to be hired but that the list of those who were merely qualified would be retained in case the well-qualified list was exhausted as positions were filled.

On March 31, 1997, Crawford Smith, a Black applicant who had scored in the qualified range and had not been hired, filed an EEOC Charge along with five other similarly situated applicants. They alleged that the City's practice of hiring only applicants who scored over 89 had a disparate impact on Black applicants. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is unlawful, unless the employer can demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Smith argued that since he was deemed qualified there was no job-related reason to limit hiring to those who scored over 89.

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice and the applicants filed suit in federal district court. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the applicants had waited too long to file with the EEOC. There is a 300 day limitations period under Title VII for filing with EEOC, and in this case the Charge was filed more than a year after the applicants had received their test results. But, the City hired applicants from the well-qualified pool during the 300 day period prior to the filing of the Charge, and continued to periodically hire from the pool as additional fire fighters were needed.

At the district court level, Crawford and the other applicants prevailed. The court denied the City's summary judgment motion, finding that the City's "ongoing reliance" on the 1995 test results constituted a continuing violation under Title VII. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that "the hiring only of applicants classified 'well-qualified' was the automatic consequence of the test scores rather than the product of a fresh act of discrimination." The Court of Appeals found that the applicants should have filed their Charge with EEOC within 300 days of receiving the test results.

The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court. Even if a plaintiff does not file a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice, the Court stated, the plaintiff may nevertheless assert a disparate impact claim in a timely charge challenging the employer's application of that practice. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Scalia was unmoved by arguments from the City and its amici (or "friends of the court") that employers could now face disparate impact suits for practices they have used regularly for years, noting "…it is not our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted."

It is fair to say that few observers would have predicted such a unanimous holding in this matter by the Court. Could the Court have been influenced by Congress' enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, reversing the Court's 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber (pdf)? In Ledbetter the Court had held a gender-based discrimination claim was not timely filed where the employee claimed her wage disparity with male co-workers resulted from personnel decisions made years earlier.

In any event, employers must now devote even greater attention to determining whether seemingly benign practices such as relying on higher test scores may disproportionately impact members of a protected class. Years can go by but each time the employer applies that practice employees will have a fresh 300 day period in which discrimination allegations can be raised. 

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This post was contributed by Samuel N. Lillard, Of Counsel, and Anthony D. Dick, an Associate, members of McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC's Labor and Employment Practice Group in Columbus, Ohio.

According to recent estimates, upwards of 90 percent of employers monitor employee workplace activity in some way or another. The appeal is obvious. When done properly, monitoring can help companies increase productivity and efficiency, protect assets and proprietary information, and identify and hopefully prevent harassing conduct, libel, employee theft, vandalism, hacking, and other inappropriate behavior. But when companies overstep permissible boundaries, their monitoring efforts can have severe legal and financial consequences. There are a substantial number of cases, including several recent decisions, where companies have learned the hard way that their right to monitor employees’ work activities has limits.

For example, in Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal.4th 272 (2009) (pdf), the employer, in a legitimate effort to determine who may have been viewing pornography on a work computer late at night, placed surveillance cameras in certain employees’ offices without the employees’ knowledge. Instead of catching the offender, the employer captured images of employees changing their clothes for post-work workouts, female employees viewing their pregnancy scars, and other private activities. In ruling against the employer, the California Supreme Court held that although employees’ right to privacy in work offices is not absolute, they have “a reasonable expectation of privacy under widely held social norms that the employer would not install video equipment capable of monitoring and recording their activities – personal and work-related – behind closed doors without their knowledge or consent.”

In a recent New Jersey case, Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. 2009) and Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, 2008 WL 6085437 (D.N.J. 2008), two restaurant servers created a password protected MySpace page where they and certain fellow co-workers could go to vent about the trials and tribulations of working in a restaurant. A supervisor learned of the MySpace page and pressured an employee with access to give him the password. Once on the site, the supervisor found messages that included sexual remarks about members of management and customers and references to violence and illegal drugs. The two servers who created the page were terminated and subsequently sued under stored communications laws that limit which individuals may access stored electronic communications. The trial court denied summary judgment to the employer holding that the restaurant’s employee monitoring authority did not include private online communications on a social network outside of work. The two employees subsequently won a small jury verdict.

The U.S. Supreme Court is set to decide a public sector employee monitoring case in its current session. In City of Ontario v. Quon, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted Dec. 14, 2009 (pdf), City of Ontario SWAT officers were given police-department-owned pagers that allowed them to send text messages. They were told in a meeting that the text messages would be treated like e-mails under the City’s employee monitoring policy and that the City would have the right to review such messages at any time to determine whether the pagers were being used for personal purposes. Despite the representations made in the meeting, officers received mixed messages from supervisors and other staff members as to whether the City would actually ever review the messages. Sgt. Jeff Quon, an officer who was issued a pager, used it on numerous occasions to send sexually explicit text messages to his wife and mistress. At some point, the City of Ontario requested Quon’s transcripts from the wireless provider without his permission and read the personal messages. Quon sued claiming the City violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. The lower court ruled in favor of the City. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments and a decision is expected in the coming months.

These cases should serve as a warning to employers. While there are no hard and fast rules to ensure that your business does not find itself involved in litigation concerning workplace surveillance and employee privacy issues, adhering to a few basic principals can help minimize the potential liability.
 

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Yes, that is right, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) (pdf), signed into law on March 23, 2010, amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to require employers to provide reasonable unpaid breaks to nursing mothers. Previously, the FLSA did not require that employers provide breaks, but now employers must provide reasonable, unpaid break time and a private space for mothers to express breast milk.

This requirement applies to all employers covered by the FLSA; however, there is an exception for small employers. Small employers are those covered by the FLSA, but with less than 50 employees. These employers need not comply with the new requirements if doing so would impose an undue hardship.

The breaks must be provided for nursing mothers for up to one year after a child's birth. While it appears that employers need not provide such breaks for exempt "white collar" employees under the FLSA, employers that do provide such breaks must be sure not to lose the exemption for such employees by improperly docking such employees' salary.

In addition to providing "reasonable break time," covered employers must also provide space, "other than a restroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public." Employers should begin to proactively identify possible private locations for nursing mothers.

The reasonable unpaid break provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Act) was effective immediately, and it is anticipated that the Department of Labor will issue regulations in the future to provide additional guidance on the Act's requirements. Pennsylvania employers should modify policies and ensure that supervisors and managers are aware of the reasonable break time provision of the Act. In addition, employers should stay tuned for further guidance from the Department of Labor.

The Act contains many provisions that will impact employers, but the breaks for nursing mothers provision was a surprise for many of us. In fact, employers have been inundated with new laws and regulations over the past year. The requirements of the Act, and other critical legal updates, will be covered in depth at the McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC 20th Annual Labor and Employment Seminar on May 21, 2010 in Hershey, Pennsylvania. For more information and to register for the Seminar, click here (pdf).

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