For years, employers have struggled with properly completing the requirements of the I-9 Form.  Every employee hired after November 6, 1986 must have an I-9 Form on file with the employer.  The Form is proof that the employer has examined documents sufficient to establish the employee’s right to work in the United States.  While the purpose of the I-9 is relatively straightforward, some large employers have faced fines amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars for errors these Forms.

With the electronic Form’s release on July 17, 2017, many of the violations that created liability should be a thing of the past.  The new form provides drop down boxes which offer options in filling out sections of the form.  The options will help in eliminating some of the common errors employers have made in the past like properly completing sections on; citizenship, immigration status, document title and state of residence.  The form’s electronic version also provides instructions for completing each section when the user clicks on the question mark in that section.

In spite of these revisions which are designed to assist in preparation of the form, some employers have chosen to print the form and fill it out on paper.  As a result, many easily avoidable mistakes remain an issue.  We advise clients to fill out the form on a computer if at all possible, thus taking advantage of the individualized instructions and drop down boxes in each section of the new I-9 Form.  We note as well that the “N” at the end of the release date in the bottom left hand corner of the form means that it is the only version currently authorized for use.  Finally, we continue to see employees who use E-Verify failing to fill out I-9s in the mistaken belief that participation in the E-Verify program releases them from the requirement to have an I-9 for each employee.  It does not.  You must prepare a new I-9 for every employee regardless of whether you participate in E-Verifying.

The new electronic I-9 Form is available at USCIS website. Use it online and make your lives easier.

Most employers take proactive steps to prevent and eliminate workplace harassment. Until recently, courts recognized and rewarded the proactive approach.  Businesses in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware could avoid liability for hostile work environment claims if they rooted out the problem before it became “severe and pervasive.”

Courts had long held that a single slur, even if highly offensive, was not pervasive and therefore could not trigger employer liability.  The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania upheld that standard in Castleberry v. STI Group, a 2015 case involving African American workers who were subjected to a racial slur and threatened with termination in a single incident.  The District Court dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the Third Circuit overturned the District’s ruling.  In doing so, the Court noted that the “plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor used a racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African-American co-workers…Within the same breath, the use of this word was accompanied by threats of termination (which ultimately occurred).”  Under these facts, the Third Circuit held that a single, isolated slur constitutes severe conduct that could create a hostile work environment.

Castleberry is now the law of the land for all Pennsylvania employers (and those in New Jersey and Delaware) who are subject to federal anti-discrimination laws. And it is certainly bad news for employers.  The ruling makes it much easier for a hostile work environment plaintiff to survive summary judgment, leading to increased defense costs and greater potential for a costly verdict.

In light of the Third Circuit’s holding, employers would be wise to take inventory of its anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are up to date and prohibit all occurrences of discriminatory harassment. Supervisors and managers should also be made aware that even a single, isolated racial slur can now lead to liability.

We will continue to monitor Third Circuit cases that develop under Castleberry and any updates will be reported here on our blog.

This post was contributed by Logan Hetherington, a McNees Summer Associate. Mr. Hetherington is a rising third year law student at Penn State Dickinson Law School and is expected to earn his J.D. in May of 2018.

Well, if you are an organization that has employees, you do! Although they may be a bit unappealing and often overlooked, worksite notices are required under both federal and state law. In fact, many municipalities and cities also have ordinances that require certain notices to be posted at the workplace. Willful failure to meet posting requirements may lead to citations and other penalties.

The postings are not only important because the government says so, they also serve an integral role in educating employees. Many of the required notices inform employees of their rights, and duties, under particular statutes. This can aid employers in several ways. For example, if employers have up-to-date notices posted where employees can frequently see them, the employers shield themselves from future issues when dealing with employee grievances because the employee cannot claim ignorance. Moreover, management will be more aware of potential illegal conduct which could put the employer in the hot seat and (hopefully) make better decisions with respect to employee relations.

The majority of required worksite notices can be acquired from the United States Department of Labor or state departments of labor. The notices and posters may be obtained free of charge from these agencies, or, employers can purchase them from private retailers. However, employers should be aware that many of these postings have specific requirements. The posters and notices must be placed where employees can openly see them and many must be posted in Spanish or other language versions if employees don’t speak English. Additionally, not all employers have to post the same notices. Government contractors, for instance, are obligated to post specific notices regarding prevailing wages and other employee rights. Likewise, smaller employers may not be subject to some posting requirements.

Even though most worksite postings are easily accessible, many employers may be surprised to learn that their posters and notices are actually out-of-date. The content of the notices change as the law does. Consequently, governments routinely revise their posters and notices but typically don’t inform employers of these revisions. Employers should routinely check their postings and update them as necessary. Our Labor and Employment Group maintains a list of required federal and Pennsylvania worksite notices. We also aid employers in navigating the complex overlap between federal, state, and local posting requirements and can help employers ensure that they are in compliance with postings and the statutes which trigger them.

The Pennsylvania Personnel Files Act (also known as the Inspection of Employment Records Law), grants employees in Pennsylvania, or their designated agents, the right to inspect certain portions of their personnel records. The Act requires employers, upon an employee’s request, to permit the employee to inspect the portions of his or her personnel file used to determine qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, termination or disciplinary action.  Employers must make the records available during regular business hours and may require employees to submit a written request form.

Until recently, the right to inspect records even extended to former employees within 30 days following their date of discharge pursuant to a rule adopted by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry.  However, in Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. v. Pa. Department of Labor & Industry, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that former employees do not have the right to inspect their personnel records.

Allowing discharged employees and their attorneys to access personnel files prior to litigation afforded them great insight into potential legal claims. This type of access to information was often used in developing a strategy for negotiations, future litigation or deciding which claims to assert.  The discharged employees and their attorneys could weigh how the employer’s articulated reason for termination lined up with (or in some cases did not line up with) what the employer documented in the personnel file.

Now, because of the Supreme Court’s decision, employers can safely refuse to grant discharged employees access to their personnel files.  The background behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals is explained below.

At the outset, a former employee filed a request, through her attorney, to view her personnel file just one week after she was discharged. The employer denied this request on the basis that the former employee was no longer employed.  The former employee filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industry claiming that the employer wrongfully denied her request for access to her personnel file. Ultimately, the Department granted the former employee’s request to inspect her personnel file.  The employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court.  On January 6, 2016, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued its decision in Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. v. Pa. Department of Labor & Industry, finding a recently discharged employee, was still an “employee” under the Personnel Files Act.

While the definition of employee under the Act (any person currently employed, laid off with reemployment rights or on a leave of absence) appears straightforward, the Commonwealth Court found that the definition did not prohibit a recently terminated individual from obtaining his or her personnel file.  The Court did note that the request must be made contemporaneously with termination or within a reasonable time immediately following termination.  This rationale was based on the 1996 Commonwealth Court decision in Beitman v. Department of Labor & Industry.  In that case, an employee requested access to her personnel file 2 years after her employment was terminated.  The majority of the Commonwealth Court found that the former employee was not permitted to access her file under the Personnel Files Act 2 years after her termination from employment.  However, the Court left open the possibility that discharged employees could access their personnel file when they requested access within a reasonable time following their termination from employment.

Following the Beitman case, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry adopted a policy that provided former employees access to their personnel files so long as they made the request within a reasonable time after termination from employment, which they determined to be approximately 30 days.  Because of this policy, employers were often required to provide former employees with access to their personnel files even after their termination from employment.

This was the background leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision.   The Supreme Court’s full opinion can be found here.

In contrast to the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court took a plain language approach in interpreting the definition of “employee.”  In doing so, the Supreme Court concluded that former employees who were not laid off with re-employment rights and who were not on a leave of absence, have no right to access their personnel file under the Act, regardless of how soon after termination the employee made the request.  The Supreme Court also specifically overruled the Beitman decision stating that the Commonwealth Court’s holding was dicta and not controlling.

While the Supreme Court’s decision is favorable to employers, this a good time to remember the importance of including proper documentation in personnel files. A well-documented personnel file that persuasively demonstrates that an employee was discharged for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons will go a long way in supporting an employer’s defenses to a former employee’s legal claims.  After all, while a former employee may not be able to review his or her record pursuant to the Act, he or she may be able to obtain a copy pursuant to a subpoena or discovery request in litigation.

Prior to June 20, 2017, a powerful tool was available to employers and workers’ compensation carriers to cap exposure on long term workers’ compensation claims.  That tool, provided by the Act 44 amendments in 1996, was called an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) and generally worked like this: once a claimant had received 104 weeks of total disability benefits and had reached maximum medical improvement, the employer could request an IRE.  A doctor was assigned to perform the evaluation and was required by statute to consult the most recent version of the American Medical Association’s guidelines.  If, under those guidelines, the IRE doctor determined that the claimant’s injury caused less than 50% whole body impairment, the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits could be modified from total to partial disability status, with a corresponding time limitation on future indemnity benefits.  The process was helpful in resolving serious injury cases, where the employee was too disabled to work but had reached a medical plateau.

Pennsylvania workers’ compensation law places no cap on the length of time in which a claimant can receive total disability benefits.  Partial disability benefits, however, are capped at 500 weeks.  Thus, via the IRE process, it was possible to prevent a claimant from receiving total disability benefits indefinitely by modifying their status to a maximum of 500 weeks of partial disability benefits.

On June 20, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court changed all of this with its decision in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.  In that case, the Court held that the IRE process was unconstitutional because the legislature is not permitted to delegate its authority to issue impairment rating guidelines to a non-legislative body (i.e. the American Medical Association).  Since the IRE provisions are legislated to be applied under the most current version of the American Medical Association guidelines (which are frequently updated), the Supreme Court struck down the IRE provisions of Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

The immediate impact of Protz on future claims is clear – unless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsiders and reverses its decision, the IRE process is no longer available to employers and workers’ compensation insurance carriers.  This means that it will be considerably more difficult to cap exposure on workers’ compensation claims where an employee has received 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and has reached maximum medical improvement.  Indeed, a reversion to the use of vocational experts to establish job availability is likely, where light duty work at the time-of-injury employer is not available.  For claims where the IRE process was used prior to the court’s decision in Protz, outcomes are less clear.

Employers who are litigating a modification of benefits based on an IRE would do well to withdraw the modification petition.  Now that the IRE process has been deemed unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, an IRE can no longer serve as a valid basis for future modification of benefits.  Without a valid basis to litigate a modification petition, employers who continue to rely on an IRE in litigation are exposed to penalties and unreasonable contest fees.

Likewise, employers who are actively seeking to obtain an IRE should refrain from doing so.  Again, the evaluation cannot provide a valid basis for modification of benefits, and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation has also indicated that it will no longer assign IRE physicians in the wake of Protz.

So what about claims where benefits have been modified or a claimant’s status has been changed as the result of a past IRE where the claimant failed to appeal?  Employers likely have no affirmative obligation to restore the pre-IRE, pre-modification status quo, but claimants may file petitions seeking to do just that.  While Pennsylvania law typically prevents the retroactive application of judicial decisions to matters that have been fully and finally determined, it is unclear how workers’ compensation judges, the Appeal Board, and Pennsylvania Courts will approach the issue. In cases where an employer obtained a modification of benefits because of an IRE and the claimant did not appeal, the doctrine of res judicata may serve to prevent re-litigation of the case.

We will continue to monitor the status and impact of Protz; additional developments will be reported here on our blog.

On April 27, 2017, the Senate confirmed R. Alexander Acosta as the Secretary of Labor.  More than four months after President Trump took office, the U.S. Department of Labor finally had a new leader.

In the ten weeks since Secretary Acosta took office, the DOL has been very busy, with a number of important actions that directly affect employers.

  • Withdrawal of Joint Employer and Independent Contractor Interpretations. On June 7, the DOL announced that it was withdrawing its 2016 and 2015 Administrator Interpretations on joint employment and independent contractors.  With this action, the Trump Administration DOL confirmed that it would walk back from the more expansive interpretations of joint employer status and employment status in independent contractor situations adopted by the Obama DOL.  This action does not mean that employers no longer face risk from possible joint employer or independent contractor situations.  Instead, the DOL has indicated that it will return to the more traditional interpretations of these concepts used by the DOL under prior Administrations.
  • Revising the Persuader Rule. On June 12, the DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to rescind and revise the enjoined so-called Persuader Rule.  The Obama-era Persuader Rule would have greatly expanded the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on employers and consultants (including lawyers) with respect to labor relations advice and services under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act’s “persuader activity” regulations.  The Obama-era Persuader Rule was permanently enjoined in November 2016, and it appears that the Trump DOL will be taking action to formally rescind the blocked rule and perhaps issue new regulations that could further modify existing reporting and disclosure requirements.
  • Return of Opinion Letters. On June 27, the DOL announced that its Wage and Hour Division will reinstate the practice of issuing opinion letters to provide guidance to employers and employees on the laws it enforces.  The Obama DOL had ceased issuing opinion letters in 2010, and the return of opinion letters will be welcomed by employers as a useful tool when interpreting the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and other federal wage and hour laws.
  • Compliance Date Pushed Back for Electronically Submitting Injury and Illness Reports to OSHA. Also on June 27, the DOL’s OSHA announced that it was delaying the compliance date for electronic reporting of injury and illness data set forth in its May 2016 regulations from July 1, 2017 until December 1, 2017.  Under the Obama DOL, OSHA intended to use the electronic submission of this data to post injury and illness data on its website from all workplaces with 20 or more employees and for those in certain high-risk industries, making the information publicly available for unions, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and others.  In its June 27 press release, OSHA indicated that it intends to revisit and further consider the controversial rule.
  • Clarification of Position on the FLSA Overtime Exemption Regulations. On June 30, the DOL filed its Reply Brief with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the pending appeal of the preliminary injunction blocking the 2016 salary-related changes to the FLSA white-collar overtime exemption regulations from taking effect.  As we have discussed at length in this blog, the Obama-era regulations more than doubled the minimum weekly salary requirement for most white-collar overtime exemptions from $455 to $913.   In November 2016, a federal district court enjoined the regulations from taking effect on December 1, 2016, and the DOL appealed this decision.

In its Reply Brief, which was the first opportunity for the Trump DOL to state its formal position on the controversial regulations, the DOL argued that the injunction blocking the regulations should be reversed, because it was based on the legal conclusion (which the DOL still believes is erroneous) that the DOL lacks the authority to impose any minimum salary requirement as part of the exemptions’ tests.  However, the DOL asked the Fifth Circuit not to address the validity of the specific minimum weekly salary level of $913 set by the 2016 regulations, because the DOL intends to revisit the salary level through the issuance of new regulations in the future.

The DOL’s position, as set forth in its Reply Brief, raises additional questions and seemingly muddies the waters even further.  Specifically, if the Fifth Circuit ultimately agrees with the DOL’s position as stated its Reply Brief, what would be the fate of the challenged 2016 regulations and their $913 weekly salary requirement?  What would be the minimum salary required for the FLSA white-collar overtime exemptions before the DOL could issue new final regulations on the minimum salary level?  On June 27, the DOL sent a Request for Information related to the overtime rule to the Office of Management and Budget for its review, indicating that it intends to initiate the rulemaking process on this issue.  However, it will take many months, if not a year or more, for the DOL to complete the rulemaking process and issue a final rule to supersede the challenged 2016 overtime regulations.

Unfortunately, the DOL’s Reply Brief seemingly raised more questions than it answered, which is not good for employers who simply wish to know the legal requirements they must meet.  We now will await oral arguments on the appeal and a decision sometime in the future.

With a Secretary of Labor now in place, we expect the DOL to continue its recent pace of activity.  Stay tuned.

In September of 2015, two delivery drivers filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The employees alleged that their former employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay them overtime between 2012 and 2015. The class subsequently ballooned to 474 members (and an additional 588 former and current delivery drivers remain eligible to opt into the class). The members asserted that over that three year period, the employer denied them overtime for five to ten hours per workweek, totaling over $10 million in allegedly unpaid wages.

The employer initially argued that the employees were exempt from overtime requirements. It claimed that in addition to making deliveries, as “Route Sales Professionals,” the drivers could make additional sales, fill orders, and upsell when making deliveries. Therefore, according to the employer, the drivers fell within the FLSA’s “outside sales person” exemption. The drivers maintained that sales were not part of their job duties; they were simply delivery drivers who did not fit within the outside sales exemption.

After two years of discovery, in April of this year, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement agreement. They asked the court to approve agreement, as is required with both FLSA claims and class actions lawsuits.

The amount: $2.5 million.

This month, the court approved the FLSA settlement. It also preliminarily granted approval of the class action settlement, subject only to a fairness hearing scheduled for September.

For our blog subscribers that have delivery drivers who also engage in incidental sales, now is the time to reevaluate how you classify those employees. In addition, this case serves as an important reminder for all employers that FLSA classifications turn on the actual job duties of the position, not the job title. In fact, a written job description will not even be controlling, unless it is an accurate reflection of the employee’s job duties.

In a closely watched case for employers, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and the U.S. Virgin Islands, recently held that retiree healthcare benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) may be subject to modification following the expiration of the CBA.

Grove v. Johnson Controls, Inc. was a class action suit brought on behalf of a group of retirees, who were all former bargaining unit members.  Generally, the retirees alleged that they were entitled to healthcare benefits “for life” pursuant to the terms of the CBAs in place at the time of retirement.  When the employer placed a cap of $50,000 on the amount of benefits to be paid to the retirees, they brought suit.  The retirees argued that their entitlement to healthcare benefits had vested, and that the employer’s decision to cap their benefits was a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act and/or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected these arguments.  The court held that the employer was not required to provide retirees healthcare benefits for life, and instead was only required to provide those benefits for the duration of the relevant CBA.  Essentially the court held that when the CBA expired, so did the employer’s obligation to continue to provide retiree healthcare benefits.  In reaching its decision, the court applied ordinary principles of contract interpretation, and noted that those principles provide that all contractual obligations cease upon the expiration of the CBA.

The court’s holding does leave open the possibility that other retirees could establish a vested entitlement to lifetime retiree healthcare benefits if the CBA language supported such a right.

As noted, this is an important decision for employers.  Many employers face significant legacy costs related to retiree healthcare, pension benefits and other post-employment benefits.  In light of Grove, many employers may begin to evaluate their post-employment benefit obligations.  However, these employers must carefully evaluate any such contractual obligations, because as Grove makes clear, whether retiree healthcare benefits are vested for life will be determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the specific CBA language.

The Secretary of Labor, John Acosta, announced recently that no further delays will apply to the Department of Labor’s new Fiduciary Rule on investment advice conflicts of interest and related prohibited transaction exemptions.  The effective date of the Rule is June 9, 2017, with an enforcement date of January 1, 2018.  The final Fiduciary Rule significantly expands the circumstances in which broker-dealers, investment advisers, insurance agents, plan consultants and other intermediaries are treated as fiduciaries to ERISA plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs).  When treated as fiduciaries, these individuals are precluded from receiving compensation that varies with the investment choices made or from recommending proprietary investment products, absent an applicable exemption.

Generally, the Fiduciary Rule provides that individuals providing fiduciary investment advice may not receive payments that pose a conflict of interest, unless a prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) applies.  The Rule recognizes several new PTEs, including

1)  “Best Interest Contract Exemption” (BIC Exemption):  Under the BIC Exemption, an advisor and firm may receive commissions and revenue sharing so long as the adviser and firm enters into a contract with its clients that:

  • Commits the firm and adviser to providing advice in the client’s best interest.
  • Warrants that the firm has adopted policies and procedures designed to mitigate conflicts of interest.
  • Clearly and prominently discloses any conflicts of interest that may prevent the adviser from providing advice in the client’s best interests.

2)  Principal Transactions Exemption:  Under this new PTE, an adviser may recommend fixed income securities and sell them from the adviser’s own inventory as long as the adviser adheres to the exemption’s consumer-protection conditions ensuring adherence to fiduciary norms and basic standards of fair dealing.

Financial institutions are advised to adopt policies and procedures ensuring that advisers comply with the Rule’s impartial conduct standards. However, during the transition period (until January 1, 2018), there is no requirement to give investors any warranty of their adoption, and those standards will not necessarily be violated if certain conflicts of interest exist.  Sponsors of ERISA-governed plans, as plan fiduciaries, are advised to clearly identify circumstances where their plan’s record keepers and advisors are acting as fiduciaries, and which services or actions are permitted under the rule’s carve-outs.

Finally, while we recommend complying with the Fiduciary Rule as soon as possible following the June 9th effective date, we note that there exists some uncertainty with the Fiduciary Rule as the DOL (i) continues to evaluate public comments, and (ii) under direction of the Trump Administration, is charged with reexamining the Fiduciary Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.

Back in 2015, Pittsburgh enacted a paid sick leave ordinance, following a trend among cities throughout the country. Pittsburgh’s paid sick leave ordinance required employers with fifteen employees or more to provide up to forty hours of paid sick leave per calendar year. Employers with less than fifteen employees were not spared. The ordinance required that those employers provide up to twenty-four hours per calendar year. The impact: 50,000 workers would receive paid sick leave.

But, what authority did Pittsburgh have to impose such a requirement?

The Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association, among others, challenged whether Pittsburgh actually had authority to enact the ordinance. Initially, the trial court found that the Steel City had no such authority. Pittsburgh appealed, arguing that because it had adopted a Home Rule Charter, it had authority to exercise broad powers and authority.

A few weeks ago, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued its opinion, agreeing with the trial court that Pittsburgh indeed lacked the necessary authority. The court found that the Home Rule Charter Law has an exception with respect to the regulation of businesses. The exception specifically provides that “a municipality which adopts a home rule charter shall not determine duties, responsibilities or requirements placed upon businesses, occupations and employers . . . except as expressly provided by [separate] statutes . . . .” Although Pittsburgh attempted to point to various statutes which it felt provided it with the needed authority, the court was not convinced. Struck down by the court, it was – and remains – the worst of times for Pittsburgh’s paid sick leave ordinance.

But, what about Philadelphia? It is a home rule charter municipality. It has a paid sick leave ordinance. Does the Commonwealth Court’s opinion effectively render its ordinance invalid, too? Nope. Philadelphia’s authority is derived from a different law, which applies only to cities of the first class (oh, and Philly is the only First Class City in Pennsylvania under the law). It includes no such limitation on the regulation of businesses. Yet, while Philadelphia’s statute may be unaffected by the court’s opinion, it may not be best of times for Philadelphia’s ordinance either. The Pennsylvania State Legislature is making efforts to affect Philadelphia and all municipalities. Senator John Eichelberger’s Senate Bill 128 would ban municipalities from passing sick leave and other leave requirements that are stronger than those required by federal and state governments. The bill was voted out of committee and is set for consideration by the Senate.

So, for our blog subscribers with businesses only in the city limits of Pittsburgh, there is no requirement that you establish a paid sick leave program for your employees. However, Philadelphia’s paid sick leave ordinance remains alive and well, and you must abide by its requirements. While some do not expect the General Assembly to move this bill through both chambers before the end of the current session, we will track the bill’s progress and update this blog should it be considered and voted on by the Senate. So, stay tuned for future posts on legislation effecting Philadelphia’s and all municipalities’ authority to impose paid sick leave requirements.